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Since 2001, the Army has spent billions of dollars to develop, test, and procure 
equipment through the Army Rapid Acquisition Process (ARAP), a process at times used 
in place of the traditional Army Acquisition Process (AAP) when immediacy and 
customization are a priority. The ARAP was implemented to increase efficiency in 
delivering adequate equipment to soldiers. The ARAP has been criticized in the literature 
for its lack of efficiency and effectiveness in the field. The purpose of this qualitative 
exploratory case study was to examine ARAP deficiencies through the lens of a broad 
cross-section of Army acquisition functional area professionals. The research questions 
addressed key problems and factors of the ARAP’s performance and its alignment with 
the ARAP, bureaucracy, and post bureaucracy. The conceptual foundation of this study 
included the theories of bureaucracy and post bureaucracy. Principles of bureaucracy are 
hierarchical structure and management by strict rules. Principles of post bureaucracy are 
flat management structures and increased autonomy. Data were collected through 
semistructured interviews from a cross-section of Army acquisition functional area 
professionals (N = 19).  Data analysis consisted of coding participant responses, which 
resulted in the emergence of themes and categories. Findings revealed the need for 
improvements to sustain, transition, and fund equipment and the need for improvements 
in developing equipment requirements and increasing direct soldier involvement when 
using the ARAP. This research provides lessons that may inform current and future 
ARAP initiatives and contributes to social change through procuring the best equipment 
for soldiers to defend against threats to national security. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Army Rapid Acquisition Process (ARAP) has been active since the early 
2000s and has resulted in the successful delivery of equipment to thousands of soldiers 
around the world. As the size of the Army begins to decrease, capturing the lessons 
learned from ARAP use may help to improve the ARAP for the future. The purpose of 
this study was to increase knowledge and understanding of the deficiencies of the ARAP 
through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area 
professionals. The ARAP has resulted in the successful delivery of equipment under 
extreme conditions to some of the world’s most remote locations, but there remains room 
for improvement. Improvements may result in developing higher quality equipment, 
delivering equipment in a timelier manner, and procuring equipment more cost 
effectively. 
This study involved examining the ARAP process, and the results include 
recommendations to improve the ARAP’s effectiveness and efficiency. The most likely 
social change that may result from this study is improving the national defense of the 
United States through better equipping soldiers to defend against threats to national 
security with improved processes. Improved processes may lead to lower equipment costs 
and enhanced equipment quality. Improved processes may also assist in delivering 
equipment to soldiers in a timelier manner, which will ultimately assist in the defense of 
the United States and will protect the lives of soldiers. 
 This chapter includes an introduction to bureaucracy theory, postbureaucracy 
theory, the Army Acquisition Process (AAP), and the ARAP. Also discussed are the 
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study’s problem statement, purpose, and three main research questions, as well as a brief 
introduction to the study methodology. Additional topics discussed are assumptions, 
scope, limitations, and delimitations of the study.  
Background 
The AAP is the standard method by which Army Acquisition Professionals within 
the U.S. Army procure and develop equipment for U.S. soldiers. The equipment procured 
under these methods is unique and not available through normal commercial resources. 
Acquisition professionals within the U.S. Army must develop, test, manufacture, and 
procure this type of military equipment in large quantities with money allocated by the 
U.S. Congress (U.S. Department of Defense [DoD], 2013b). This process is slow, 
structured, hierarchal, and inefficient. The AAP performs in a manner akin to the 
characteristics of bureaucracy. The AAP is inefficient and is frequently too slow to be 
responsive to the urgent materiel needs of soldiers. 
The United States has participated in two recent wars: the Iraq War, which began 
in 2003, and the Afghanistan War, which began in 2001. During this time frame, the 
AAP has been ineffective (Whaley & Stewart, 2014), in part due to the inability to deliver 
equipment to soldiers before conditions on the battlefield evolved (Block, 2012). By the 
time the Army developed, tested, and procured a piece of equipment, the equipment was 
no longer effective because the enemy had changed the manner in which it operated. 
The AAP is a complex, methodical approach created to outfit soldiers with the 
best available equipment to maintain military superiority over enemies of the United 
States. The current AAP has proven not suitable during peacetime due to the extended 
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time required to deliver equipment to soldiers; thus, there has been a need for ARAP to 
develop and procure equipment for soldiers (Lopez, 2013). According to a 2013 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office report, the average acquisition program in 2012 was 
more than 24 months behind schedule, and 39% of the programs were at least 25% over 
the initial cost per piece of equipment. An example that demonstrates the AAP’s 
inefficiencies and inadequacies is the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS; Block, 2012). 
Acquisition professionals within the Army spent 15 years on this program with the intent 
of developing a universal radio for use in all U.S. armed services (Army, Air Force, 
Navy, and Marines) to communicate while jointly conducting operations. The predicted 
initial cost of the JTRS was $2 million, but before officials finally discontinued the effort, 
costs exceeded $6 billion. After 15 years of research and development, as well as the 
production of numerous prototypes, the Army managed to procure a few different 
improved radio systems, but not the desired universal radio. The AAP failed to produce 
an adequate radio in a timely manner. 
Inadequacies and inefficiencies of the AAP include failing to deliver quality 
equipment to soldiers in a timely manner, as noted with the JTRS. Another inadequacy of 
the AAP is lack of stable equipment performance requirements, due to rapid changes in 
tactics on the battlefield (Rosen, 2013). The requirements are unstable because the U.S. 
Army’s adversaries adapt to the manner in which the U.S. Army operates. In an effort to 
keep up with these changes, the AAP equipment performance requirements undergo 
alterations. The continuous change in requirements often extends the timeline for 
delivering equipment to soldiers.  
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Due to the deficiencies and inefficiencies of the AAP, Army leadership instituted 
the ARAP. The ARAP represents an attempt to fill the gap created by the AAP by 
quickly meeting current equipment acquisition needs through a more streamlined process. 
Commanders often make urgent equipment requests through the ARAP. However, much 
of the equipment delivered is prototype equipment that is immature and presents 
logistical issues (Whitson, 2012; Williams, Drezner, McKernan, Shontz, & Sollinger, 
2014). Immature equipment is not generally repairable within the Army’s logistical 
system, and Army commanders must often purchase the same equipment again (Whaley 
& Stewart, 2014). Alternatively, contractor service support companies may maintain or 
service some equipment, but they often charge high rates. 
The method for managing the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the AAP within 
the Army is to procure equipment through the ARAP, which is an alternative approach. 
The ARAP is an umbrella term that encompasses four methods for the rapid procurement 
of equipment in the U.S. Army. The four methods are the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
(JRAC; DoD, 2012), Rapid Equipping Force (REF; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command [TRADOC], 2013), Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI; Department of the Army, 
2009), and Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT; TRADOC, 2013). 
The four rapid fielding processes generally produce equipment quickly for soldiers, but 
their shortfalls include immaturity of equipment, which often presents logistical issues 
(Whitson, 2012). Like the postbureaucratic theoretical approach, the process is nimble, 
the organizational structure is flatter, there is less competition, and managers and 
supervisors have increased flexibility.  
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The present research was necessary to determine ways in which the ARAP can 
lead to the effective and efficient delivery of quality equipment to soldiers. The study 
may benefit soldiers because, as a result of a better understanding of the system’s 
shortfalls and the implementation of improvements, they may receive equipment that is 
better than the equipment they currently receive. Additionally, the study could benefit 
taxpayers through improved efficiencies in the ARAP and the AAP. The study is also 
necessary because as the number of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan decreases, it is important 
to capture the lessons learned for the next conflict that U.S. soldiers may encounter to 
improve future ARAP acquisitions. 
Problem Statement 
Acquisition professionals within the U.S. Army expended over $76 billion using 
the ARAP from 2005 through 2010 in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars to develop, test, and 
deliver equipment to soldiers, but they failed to document adequately the issues and 
lessons learned from the ARAP during the wars (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2011a). If adequately documented, the lessons learned could be applicable to the Army’s 
next war. Pernin et al. (2014), Rasch (2011), Riposo, McKernan, and Duran (2014), Solis 
(2011), Whaley and Stewart (2014), and Williams et al. (2014) conducted research within 
the Army acquisition community that documented problems associated with the ARAP 
from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  
The general management problem is that ARAP needs improvement and could 
increase its efficiency in delivering adequate equipment to soldiers. In relation to this 
general problem, a gap in ARAP research exists in various Army acquisition functional 
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areas. Studying the ARAP across all functions as a system, using professionals who have 
dealt with the ARAP daily and for at least 6 years, could provide new insights. The 
specific management problem is the gap in knowledge and understanding about the 
ARAP. Only an evaluation of the ARAP by a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals can narrow this gap. This study differs from and expands 
upon other published studies because its scope is broader and it includes data from 
subject matter experts across the various acquisition functional areas that play critical 
roles in the approval process for developing and delivering equipment to soldiers under 
the ARAP. This research improves knowledge and understanding of the ARAP by 
validating, invalidating, or adding to the current body of published research on the 
ARAP. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this exploratory case study was to increase knowledge and 
understanding of the deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section 
of Army acquisition functional area professionals. Although there has been some research 
on ARAP, the research conducted to date has failed to use the expertise and competencies 
of the various acquisition functional areas. Previous research included a narrow range of 
acquisition expertise, mostly from a program management perspective, and relied 
primarily on personal opinion rather than scholarly analysis of original documents and 
experiences. There is a need to expand ARAP research and to consider the views of 
acquisition professionals from a wider range of functional specialties and expertise. The 
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acquisition functional areas considered for this study were program management, 
contracting, test and evaluation, science and technology, and systems engineering. 
I used purposive and snowball sampling to find 19 Army acquisition professionals 
to interview in the Mid-Atlantic Region who were Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III certified in an acquisition functional area. The 
focus of this study was exploring the perceptions of Army acquisition professionals on 
ARAP issues and deficiencies. The results from this study include recommendations that 
may assist in developing and procuring improved equipment more efficiently, more 
effectively, and in a shorter time. This study has potential to contribute to positive social 
change by supporting improvement to the national defense of the United States through 
better equipping soldiers to defend against threats to national security.  
Research Questions 
The questions for the qualitative study were as follows: 
RQ1: What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of equipment using the 
current ARAP?  
RQ2: What key factors are present that impact the performance effectiveness and 
efficiency of ARAP and that could serve as a basis for developing improvements in 
equipment acquisition? 
RQ3: How do the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy align with and 




I grounded this study in the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy. De 
Gourmay first used the term bureaucracy in 1765. Bureaucracy is typically a set of 
hierarchical rules established by a governing body that define authority and relationships 
(Hull, 2012). Weber (2012) described management with a heavy reliance on rules as one 
of the six characteristics of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is also the process by which 
organizational leaders in government and many other large organizations plan and 
conduct their operations (Augustine & Agu, 2013). Postbureaucracy was the other main 
theory applied within this study.  
In contrast to bureaucracy, postbureaucracy is a theory of management whose 
proponents aim to increase efficiencies within workplaces subject to bureaucracy. 
Postbureaucracy is a response to some of the inefficiencies associated with bureaucracy 
(Bezes et al., 2012; Handel, 2013; Zafra-Gómez, Prior, Díaz, & López-Hernández, 2013). 
Within postbureaucracy, new public management (NPM) is the practical implementation 
of certain management techniques. Postbureaucracy is the theoretical aspect of 
management, whereas NPM is the practical aspect of management implementation 
(Pollitt & Dan, 2013). New public management has also been a response to 
environmental conditions that resulted from expanding the Internet and using new 
information technology tools (Aykac & Metin, 2012).  
I demonstrate in Chapter 2 how the two theories in this research project are 
analogous to the two different acquisition processes and relate closely to this study 
because of their parallel relationship. The AAP is comparable to bureaucracy because it 
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operates in a slow, methodical manner with minimal consideration for time constraints 
when completing tasks. The ARAP, in comparison, includes some of the postbureaucracy 
principles such as nimbleness and the ability to adjust to rapidly evolving requirements 
from soldiers. The ARAP can be unstable at times and focused on short-term goals with 
little regard for the future or long-term impacts of decisions. 
Conceptual Framework 
The theory of postbureaucracy is viewable through the theoretical lens of the self-
organizing principle. The self-organizing principle from a management perspective refers 
to groups or individuals who internally manage their tasks while operating together to 
achieve an overall goal (Hoda, Noble, & Marshall, 2012). Self-organization is a key 
characteristic of organizations that successfully respond to change. Self-organization also 
occurs in the management of organizations.  
 Under the self-organization principle, groups or individuals within organizations 
will continue to strive and achieve overall goals, even if there are obstacles hindering 
goal achievement. Raelin (2012) noted the importance of institutions self-organizing in 
an effort to achieve optimal productivity while operating under the ideology of 
postbureaucracy theory. The methods for achieving such goals are not always 
conventional, and the approach to achieving such goals is somewhat unconventional. The 
conceptual framework for this study appears in Figure 1, which includes the addition of 




According to Whaley and Stewart (2014), AAP lacks the ability to rapidly 
resource soldiers with essential equipment in a timely manner. In an effort to respond to 
the need for more rapid acquisition of equipment, individuals within the Army self-
organized and established the ARAP to achieve the goal of rapidly equipping soldiers. 
The ARAP represented a means to circumvent the normal process and self-organize to 
achieve the goal of rapidly equipping soldiers. A discussion of the REF and other 
organizations that use the ARAP appears in Chapter 2. These organizations serve as 
examples of how the leaders of institutions can self-organize to meet urgent needs.  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework diagram. 
Four research phenomena underwent analysis in this study. The four phenomena 
were workplace production inefficiencies, lack of cognitive rationale, dynamism, and 
lack of long-term forethought. Workplace production inefficiencies and lack of cognitive 
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rationale correlate to bureaucracy theory. Dynamism and a lack of long-term forethought 
correlate to postbureaucracy theory. The four phenomena undergo a detailed analysis in 
Chapter 2.  
The phenomena and self-organization principles connected to the research 
questions. The answers to the research questions provide additional insight into 
dynamism and lack of long-term forethought as this research study related to 
postbureaucracy and NPM initiatives. The four research phenomena and self-organization 
principles were topics discussed during interviews with study participants. 
Nature of the Study 
This exploratory qualitative case study involved interviewing Army acquisition 
professionals who had experience working with the ARAP. I selected the case study 
methodology because Stake (1995) and Yin (2014) indicated that researchers can better 
accommodate complex issues in case studies. The complexity of the ARAP extends 
beyond developing, procuring, testing, and fielding equipment to soldiers. Other factors 
contribute to the complexity of the ARAP, such as budget cycles, congressional 
reductions in funding, requirement changes from the user community, technical issues in 
developing equipment, safety concerns discovered while testing equipment, 
manufacturing and production issues, congressional investigations, and other unforeseen 
issues that can derail a program. A structured set of interview questions or a survey 
would not have been suitable for exploring these factors. Instead, I employed open-ended 
questions, and the participants discussed these issues freely and identified factors not 
already researched in the scholarly literature. 
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Within this study, I captured themes that emerged that explained the inability of 
ARAP to deliver equipment to soldiers in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. This 
study also involved searching for patterns in the data and using direct interpretation to 
make assertions about the inability to deliver quality equipment to soldiers within an 
acceptable timeline. Baškarada (2013) noted that the pattern approach and direct 
interpretation are two common techniques for case study analysis. The qualitative 
approach was suitable because the nature of the problem required in-depth, open-ended 
interviews and analysis of written documents.  
The methodology included purposive and snowball sampling techniques for 19 
Army acquisition professionals who had worked in the Army acquisition community for 
a minimum of 6 years and were DAWIA Level III certified in a functional area. First, I 
created interview questions and conducted a field test with subject matter experts from 
the Army acquisition field. After the field study was complete, I sampled the population 
through semistructured interviews. Finally, I transcribed, coded, and analyzed the data 
with NVivo 11 qualitative analysis software.  
Definitions 
Acquisition: The conceptualization, initiation, design, development, testing, 
contracting, production, deployment, logistics support, modification, and disposal of 
weapons and other systems, supplies, or services, including construction, to satisfy DoD 




Army Acquisition Process or Army Acquisition Procedures (AAP): The formal 
process guided by the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) that guides development, 
procurement, testing, and contractual management for all major equipment procured for 
all of the armed services (Department of the Army, 2014). 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process (ARAP): An umbrella term that covers four 
methods used to procure equipment rapidly to meet the needs of soldiers supporting 
combat operations. These four methods are the JRAC (DoD, 2012), REF (TRADOC, 
2013), RFI (Department of the Army, 2009), and CDRT (TRADOC, 2013). In their 
management, the four rapid-fielding processes occur independently of each other and 
under various, largely separate, regulations. 
Bureaucracy: A set of rules established by a governing body with the aim of 
creating hierarchical structures, defining both authority and relationships, and instituting 
a standard methodology for conducting business within the organization. Bureaucracy is 
the process by which organizational leaders plan and conduct their daily operations and 
make plans for the future of the organization (Adler, 2012). Bureaucracy includes the 
following six characteristics: hierarchical structure, management focused on rules, 
organization by functional specialty, higher mission focus or internal mission focus, 
remaining impersonal, and employment based on technical qualifications (Weber, 2012). 
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT): A semiannual Army 
process that involves identifying the best nonstandard materiel and nonmateriel solutions. 
Leaders of TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Asymmetric Warfare 
Division manage the CDRT process in partnership with Headquarters, Department of the 
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Army G-3/5/7 Capability Integration Division. The goal for CDRT is to reduce 
significantly the time it takes to field selected systems or capabilities to the operational 
force. The CDRT process also involves recommending disposition for those capabilities 
not selected as enduring, either for retention (e.g., sustain) within the operational theaters 
or for termination of all Army support. Operational Army unit survey responses provide 
the basis for recommendations. The CDRT process is one of the four ARAP processes 
that aim to provide equipment to soldiers more efficiently and effectively (TRADOC, 
2013). 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS): The higher process that guides the 
development and delivery of equipment in the AAP and ARAP. The DoD Instruction 
5000.02 directive manages the DAS (DoD, 2015). All four armed services acquire major 
equipment using the general guidance of the DAS. 
Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS): The Joint 
Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process generates three 
different requirement documents that support the DAS: the initial capability document, 
the capability development document, and the capability production document. All three 
are necessary for developing and procuring equipment for the Army in the AAP. 
Requirement writers often reference JCIDS documents when developing requirement 
documents for the ARAP. JCIDS documents contain analytical data on potential materiel 




Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC): An organization established by the deputy 
secretary of defense that serves as a collaborative body for all the armed services. The 
organizational leaders prioritize numerous requirement requests, determine solutions, and 
find and allocate funding for the new equipment. The JRAC reports directly to the 
undersecretary of defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and oversees (with the 
Joint Staff J-8) the implementation of joint urgent operational needs and joint emergent 
operational needs. Joint urgent operational needs and joint emergent operational needs 
are requirement documents or requests that the Army submits to the JRAC in the ARAP. 
JRAC produces requirement documents for the ARAP (DoD, 2012). 
New public management (NPM): The practical aspect of management 
implementation (Aykac & Metin, 2012; Pollitt & Dan, 2013) and the response to new 
work environments under postbureaucratic initiatives. New public management is a 
management tool that measures performance with metrics (Buschor, 2013; Speklé & 
Verbeeten, 2014). 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE): A calendar-driven 
event designed to provide commanders in the field with the best mix of soldiers, 
equipment, and support within reason based on financial constraints across fiscal years. 
PPBE supports the AAP. The ARAP lacks such a system for planning and programming 
funding for equipment (DoD, 2013b). 
Postbureaucracy: A management approach to modernizing the public sector 
through the use of business and market-oriented processes that have a heavy focus on 
performance metrics and results. Postbureaucracy is a response to some of the 
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inefficiencies associated with bureaucracy (Bezes et al., 2012; Handel, 2013; Zafra-
Gómez et al., 2013). 
Rapid Equipping Force (REF): One of the four ARAP methods, the U.S. Army 
REF rapidly provides urgent capabilities to U.S. Army forces employed globally by 
harnessing current and emerging technologies to improve operational effectiveness. The 
REF is a capability provider empowered to act quickly on behalf of the Department of the 
Army G-3, also known as the Army’s main operation center located in the Pentagon, to 
provide soldiers and commanders with important capabilities that increase lethality, 
improve force protection, and enhance their survivability against highly adaptive enemies 
(U.S. Army, 2014). 
Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI): One of the four ARAP methods, the RFI is an 
organization created to leverage current procurement programs; commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) technology; and lessons learned from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 
combat zones promptly to enhance the survivability, lethality, and mobility of soldiers 
deployed in support of overseas contingency operations. To maintain its currency and 
relevance, TRADOC personnel update, and Department of the Army personnel approve, 
the list of RFI equipment fielded to soldiers regularly. The RFI personnel distribute 
mission-essential equipment of the highest capability to each deploying soldier. Every 
soldier, regardless of unit type, undergoes assessment as a system and receives the 
equipment necessary to execute a specific mission (Department of the Army, 2009). 
Systems Planning, Research, Development, and Engineering: Known in 
abbreviated form as systems engineering, this interdisciplinary approach encompasses the 
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entire technical effort to evolve and verify an integrated and total life-cycle-balanced set 
of system, people, and process solutions that satisfy defense customer needs. Systems 
engineering is the integrating mechanism across technical efforts related to development, 
manufacturing, verification, deployment, operations, support, disposal, and user training 
for systems and their life cycle processes. Systems engineering develops technical 
information to support the program management decision-making process. The REF and 
other government agencies with system engineers rapidly develop prototype equipment 
for soldiers using the ARAP (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
System Engineering, 2014). 
Test and evaluation: A process by which the Army Test and Evaluation 
Command exercises a system or components of a system and analyzes results to gather 
performance-related information. The information has many uses, including risk 
identification and risk mitigation, and involves empirical data to validate models and 
simulations. Test and evaluation enable an assessment of the attainment of technical 
performance, specifications, and system maturity to determine whether systems are 
operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for their intended use. Various types of 
test and evaluation defined in statutes or regulations include developmental test and 
evaluation, operational test and evaluation, live-fire test and evaluation, and 
interoperability certification. Test and evaluation are necessary for equipment developed 
under the ARAP. Test and evaluation are often abbreviated, but this step is necessary to 




This study included two main assumptions regarding the DAS, the AAP, and the 
ARAP. The first assumption was that a higher DAS, as a process, would remain largely 
stable. The second assumption was that acquisition professionals within the Army would 
have permission to improve the ARAP within the DAS and AAP. These assumptions 
were necessary to this study because they demonstrated the practical application of the 
study, which helped to support the relevancy of the study.  
The assumptions were relevant to this study because the ARAP is necessary, 
given that the AAP suffers from many issues, including high rates of inefficiency and an 
inability to change the culture of the Army to meet the current requirements of soldiers 
quickly. Many researchers have conducted studies and provided reasonable 
recommendations, yet leaders have ultimately ignored recommendations on how to 
improve both the AAP and the ARAP (Eide & Allen, 2012; Rasch, 2011). Only limited 
change has occurred as a result of the numerous studies conducted on the AAP and the 
ARAP. Army acquisition leaders have been unwilling to implement and heed the 
recommendations from the studies. This study differs because it consists of a broad cross-
section of Army acquisition functional area professionals who play critical roles in the 
approval process for developing and delivering equipment to soldiers under the ARAP. 




Scope and Delimitations 
The focus of this study was on the ARAP and not the standard AAP. The ARAP 
is narrow enough for gathering data and allowing a researcher to make reasonable, 
bounded conclusions. The study’s focus also included experiences and lessons learned 
during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. 
The population selected for this study came from a pool of acquisition 
professionals from the Army Acquisition Corps with ARAP experience. Most of this 
population pool had DoD acquisition certifications that qualified them as experts in their 
acquisition functional area. Individuals in the general population did not qualify to 
participate in this study because they would lack expertise in the ARAP. The results of 
this study may be transferable to other practitioners within the Army acquisition 
workforce. Leaders in the acquisition workforce may be able to apply some of the 
recommendations made for the ARAP to standard acquisitions.  
Limitations 
Selecting inappropriate study participants is a threat to quality and was a possible 
limitation to the study. To mitigate this limitation, I ensured that at least 80% of study 
participants were DAWIA Level III certified. This certification ensures that individuals 
are familiar with ARAP and Army acquisition processes supporting the ARAP. Study 
participants also had at least 6 years of Army acquisition work experience with projects 
that entailed close collaboration with Army acquisition program offices. Study 
participants also had at least 2 years of workforce experience within the required 6 years 
supporting Army acquisition programs through the ARAP.  
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The purposive sampling method was a limitation for this study. Purposive 
sampling is nonprobability-based sampling that is not necessarily reflective of the 
population (Gentles, Charles, Ploeg, & McKibbon, 2015). Researchers design purposive 
sampling for specific populations and research topics. The purposive sampling method 
served as a limitation because it affected the universality and generalizability of the 
research results in comparison to random sampling. 
Limitations for this study included selecting study participants to interview who 
may have had a bias toward using the AAP. It could also have been a challenge to keep 
the study participants focused on the topic of the ARAP versus the AAP. When 
answering interview questions, there could have been be a tendency for study participants 
to answer the questions in the terms of the AAP. To mitigate this, I focused the questions 
specifically on ARAP and refrained from AAP discussions.  
Another limitation or focal area that may have limited the results of the study 
involved the U.S.-led war efforts that began in 2001 and that provided large amounts of 
money directed toward purchasing equipment though the ARAP. The amount of money 
spent on DoD initiatives is declining and will continue to decline for the foreseeable 
future, given the budget constraints within the U.S. government (Hagel, 2015; Zakheim, 
2014). It may be challenging to convince study participants to give credence to the near-
term future of the ARAP given current and future funding cuts. 
There may have been a perception that this research would not address users of 
the equipment. Though this study did not include a participant category defined as users 
of the equipment, the study did include users of the equipment, because many of the 
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study participants were retired military personnel who were former users of military 
equipment with experience using the ARAP. Some of the personnel interviewed were 
still serving in the military as U.S. Army Acquisition Corps officers. The officers were 
former users of the equipment, and they had experience with the ARAP. Many of the 
officers had combat experience in the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, or both.  
Significance of the Study 
The focus of this study was increasing knowledge and understanding of the 
deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals. In this study, I identified problems that hinder the quick 
development, procurement, and delivery of quality equipment to soldiers through ARAP. 
This study filled a gap in the knowledge and understanding about ARAP’s deficiencies 
using data collected from a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional areas. 
Though some research on ARAP exists, the research does not reflect the expertise and 
competencies of the various acquisition functional areas. Existing research is from a 
narrow range of acquisition professionals, mostly program managers, supported primarily 
by personal opinion rather than scholarly analysis of original documents and experiences. 
Because of the narrow focus of previous research, there is a need to expand ARAP 
research and consider the views of acquisition professionals from a wider range of 
functional specialties and expertise.  
Significance to Theory and Practice 
This study may add value to the Army because it includes recommendations to 
improve the ARAP. It was important to capture the ARAP lessons learned during the two 
22 
 
recent wars. The captured lessons learned from this study may assist in preparing U.S. 
Army leaders to improve the ARAP in future major conflicts. Recommendations from 
this study could benefit soldiers who receive improved equipment in a timelier manner to 
counter current threats more quickly and to fill capability gaps. This study may lead 
acquisition professionals to a better understanding of ways to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the ARAP. This study is also valuable because it includes insight on 
bureaucracy and postbureaucracy theories as practiced within the Army.  
Significance to Social Change 
 This study may contribute to efforts to strengthen the national defense of the 
United States by better equipping soldiers to defend against threats to national security 
through improved processes. The study may also provide recommendations for cost 
savings from reduced Army acquisition timelines or the timely delivery of suitable 
equipment to soldiers. These improvements may ultimately save soldiers’ lives and 
reduce the procurement of nonstandard equipment that increases long-term maintenance 
costs. 
Summary and Transition 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the various 
elements of this study. This chapter included the background, purpose, and three main 
research questions for this study. This chapter also included a brief review of the 
theoretical nature of this study, addressing the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy. The chapter included a brief introduction and discussion of the two 
theories; an overview of the study methodology; and the assumptions, scope, limitations, 
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and delimitations of this study. The chapter concluded with a statement of the 
significance of the study.  
 Chapter 2 includes the literature review, for which I searched numerous research 
databases using iterative terms related to bureaucracy and postbureaucracy. The chapter 
includes a review and synthesis of recent literature with a primary focus on the theories 
of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy. Current themes from the two theories undergo 
further analysis as the theoretical foundation of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The purpose of this study was to increase knowledge and understanding of the 
deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals. The general management problem was that the ARAP 
requires improvement and is inefficient in delivering adequate equipment to soldiers. 
There was a gap in ARAP research from various Army acquisition functional areas. The 
specific management problem was this gap in knowledge and understanding about the 
ARAP. Only an evaluation of the ARAP by a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals could narrow this gap.  
The standard AAP is a complex methodical approach with the aim to outfit 
soldiers with the best available equipment to maintain military superiority. Questions 
regarding the suitability of the AAP during times of war have existed for some time 
(Whaley & Stewart, 2014). Two major prolonged wars have revealed the ineffectiveness 
of the AAP in meeting soldiers’ equipment needs in a timely manner (Whaley & Stewart, 
2014). According to a 2013 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, research 
demonstrated that from 2008 to 2012, the average major acquisition program schedule 
increased from 22 to 27 months, and costs grew during this same time frame from $323 
billion to $411 billion (Schultz, 2014). This scheduled increase demonstrates the 
inefficiencies of the AAP.  
As a result of AAP inefficiencies, four distinct rapid acquisition processes 
comprise what is collectively known as the ARAP. The ARAP now exists to fill the gap 
in meeting material acquisition needs quickly. The four processes are JRAC (DoD, 
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2012), REF (TRADOC, 2013), RFI (Department of the Army, 2009), and the CDRT 
(TRADOC, 2013). Commanders often make urgent equipment requests through one of 
the four rapid material acquisition processes. Much of the equipment delivered is 
prototype equipment that is immature (Solis, 2011; Whitson, 2012) and presents 
logistical issues (Rasch, 2011; Whitson, 2012).  
This chapter consists of six sections: Introduction, Literature Search Strategy, 
Theoretical Foundations, Conceptual Framework, Literature Review of Key Variables, 
and Summary and Conclusion. An analysis of Weber’s bureaucracy theory includes 
themes related to legitimacy, rationalization, authority, ideal bureaucracy, and the iron 
cage. Postbureaucracy, with an emphasis on NPM, undergoes analysis as a modern form 
of government for both established and developing nations. Also analyzed is the 
existence of hybrid forms of government that embrace both bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy. The methodology chapter follows this chapter. 
Literature Search Strategy 
During the literature review, I searched numerous databases to gain insight on 
current literature on the topic of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy theorists. The 
databases available from the Walden Library were Sage, EBSCOhost, Blackwell, 
Elsevier, Google Scholar, and Emerald. I also searched the Defense Technical 
Information Center in depth for information specifically related to DoD acquisition 
studies. Using numerous search terms led to current trends within the literature. The 
iterative terms used to explore the literature were as follows: traditional bureaucracy, 
bureaucracy, bureaucratic theory, postbureaucracy, adaptive organizations, complex 
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leadership theory, complex adaptive theories, change management theories, change 
management drivers, new public management, network enterprise, postmodern 
organizations, flexible organizations, public choice theory, flexible firms, governance 
networks, public sector collaboration innovation, and hierarchy theory. The theorists 
investigated in the databases were Max Weber, Henri Fayol, and Frederick Taylor. 
I also researched other theorists as part of the literature review. Those theorists 
included Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Anthony Downs, and Mary Parker Follett. 
Hegel was not a main theorist of interest for this study because the focus of much of his 
work on bureaucracy was on the social aspects of bureaucracy, but Weber focused on 
rational and legal authority, which aligned better with this study. Downs was also not a 
primary theorist for this study because Weber’s works served as the basis of many of his 
works. Follett was a management theorist who published management studies with 
practical application, but Follett often did not include bureaucracy as a central theme in 
studies.  
The search started broadly with an investigation into several terms related to 
bureaucracy. The search included many of the iterative terms listed above and eventually 
narrowed to bureaucracy and postbureaucracy as the two main theories. Postbureaucracy 
is a broad management term found throughout the literature. In this study, NPM 
underwent analysis as an application of the postbureaucracy theory in government 
organizations, specifically the U.S. Army. Sage, Science Direct, and Emerald were the 
most germane databases in researching bureaucracy and postbureaucracy. These three 
databases provided the most relevant information on the two theories and on 
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postbureaucracy initiatives such as NPM. The three databases provided sources 
containing in-depth analysis on issues associated with bureaucracy. 
Theoretical Foundations 
Bureaucracy 
The foundation for this study was the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy. De Gourmay coined the term bureaucracy in 1765. The meaning of the 
term at its origin was not positive, and the negative connotations have continued. Since 
its inception, people have associated the term with inefficiency, routines, and inhibited 
actions for personnel (Hull, 2012). Although this term was first coined in 1765, ruling 
empires have been adhering to the principles of bureaucracy for the past 12,000 years 
(Diefenbach & By, 2012). The amount of time that leaders of nations have been 
effectively using bureaucracy lends credibility to bureaucracy as a legitimate tool. 
In the 21st century, bureaucracy refers to a set of rules established by a governing 
body with the aims of creating hierarchical structures, defining both authority and 
relationships, and instituting a standard methodology or rules for conducting business 
within the organization (Augustine & Agu, 2013; Diefenbach & By, 2012). Kanninen and 
Piiparinen (2014) and Tholen (2015) noted that the key benefits of bureaucracy are its 
ability to manage administrative tasks efficiently with an additional benefit of having 
access to people with expertise in various fields. Kanninen and Piiparinen (2014) and 
Tholen (2015) further noted that bureaucracy provides discipline, stability, and reliability 
with regard to managing administrative tasks. The U.S. founding fathers established a 
government based on the principles of bureaucracy.  
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The leaders of many Western countries, specifically the United States, embraced 
bureaucracy in the late 19th century during an era in which the United States led the 
world in the industrial revolution (Parker & Ritson, 2011). After the U.S. victory in 
World War II, bureaucracy gained legitimacy as a management tool for the world’s 
newest and strongest superpower. Bureaucracy continued to serve as the most effective 
management tool through the industrial revolution, World War II, and the end of the Cold 
War. The type of bureaucracy defined by Weber is structured, slow, and hierarchical and 
was appropriate for that period (Kanninen & Piiparinen, 2014). The age of the Internet 
challenged the effectiveness of Weber’s bureaucracy, supported the need for 
postbureaucracy, and sparked debate on a modern form of bureaucracy known as 
postbureaucracy.  
Postbureaucracy 
After the Cold War, globalization transformed the world into a more dynamic 
environment. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Internet created a new world 
marketplace that leveled the playing field for many nations, individuals, and 
organizations (Major, 2012). The level playing field increased competition in the 
marketplace because information flowed more freely, and merchandise and services were 
available to a wider customer audience. The bureaucratic system demonstrated signs of 
weakness in this new marketplace, as it was inflexible and lacked the nimbleness and 
creativity required to operate effectively in modern global markets (Bond & O'Byrne, 
2014; Haque, 2013; Kanninen & Piiparinen, 2014). Some scholars and managers called 
for the implementation of postbureaucratic systems (Colon & Guerin-Schneider, 2015; 
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Haque, 2013; Lee, 2012). These scholars recognized that the changing dynamics within 
the management field required a postbureaucratic approach.  
Supporters of postbureaucracy strive to modernize bureaucratic systems with 
businesslike and result-oriented processes. Postbureaucracy is also defined as a set of 
corporate, businesslike management practices that focus on performance and results 
(Clegg, 2012). The aim of postbureaucracy is to transition organizations into results-
oriented corporations that focus on cost, schedule, and performance (Diefenbach, 2009). 
Advocates of postbureaucracy note that its benefits include improved competitiveness, 
decentralization, performance accountability, an increase in manager and worker 
autonomy, flexibility, and nimbleness (Haque, 2013; Wihantoro, Lowe, Cooper, & 
Manochin, 2015). These advocates see a need to turn away from bureaucracy and 
embrace postbureaucracy efforts to keep pace with the modern digital age. 
Postbureaucracy advocates see Weber’s bureaucracy theory as outdated and ineffective. 
Bureaucracy Theory  
The major theoretical propositions for bureaucracy theory originated from Weber, 
who is the premier and most influential social theorist on the topic of bureaucracy. Weber 
has a wide breadth of well-known work on the theory of bureaucracy. Weber noted that 
bureaucracy is necessary and the most efficient tool to organize governments (Weber, 
2012). Al-Habil (2011) furthered the theoretical proposition by contending that although 
Weber recognized that bureaucracy is not a perfect tool, it serves as the most rational, 
efficient, and proven system invented to date. 
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Weber was a sociologist by profession and wrote a great deal on the topic of 
bureaucracy. Weber (2012) wrote about many sociological topics, but for this study, the 
focus was on his works related to bureaucracy. Weber analyzed the theory of bureaucracy 
under the following four areas: legitimacy, authority, rationalization, and ideal 
bureaucracy. The four concepts surface on a regular basis in much of the recent literature. 
Many of the recent works on legitimacy, authority, rationalization, and ideal bureaucracy 
within the literature trace back to Weber and his theory of bureaucracy. 
Misinterpretation of the theory has resulted in some scholars calling Weber’s 
theory of bureaucracy obsolete due to the complex global environment in which the 
world now operates. Managers and scholars have used Weber’s theory of the ideal 
bureaucracy to recommend radical paradigm shifts that could change organizations 
(Bartels, 2009). A new radical shift involves reorganizing organizations to reflect 
horizontal structures as opposed to traditional vertical hierarchical organizations. The 
structure would enable organizations to be more agile and have the ability to react to 
dynamic global markets. Scholars seeking a radical shift prefer flattened organizations 
that are different from the stovepipe and vertical hierarchical organizational structures. 
Scholars and practitioners supporting the radical structure change make it known that the 
efficiency of bureaucracy can drastically improve through such changes. 
Weber’s ideal bureaucracy is an example of how bureaucracy can work in a 
perfect world. Ideal bureaucracy is a goal. According to Bartels’s (2009) and Jørgensen’s 
(2012) assessment, Weber admitted in his writings that ideal bureaucracy did not exist 
and would not exist in the real world. Bartels noted that many scholars in the 
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management field dismissed Weber’s theory of the ideal bureaucracy due to a 
misinterpretation of the theory.  
Bartels (2009) contended that Weber’s ideal bureaucracy can help both scholars 
and practitioners advance the understanding of the bureaucratic rationale of civil servants. 
Good bureaucratic rationale involves using mental cognitive skills to make decisions as 
opposed to simply following rules. For example, civil servant bureaucrats who receive 
guidance that they deem unjust may confer with their boss before executing the guidance. 
Clarifying the guidance demonstrates good judgment. If bosses justify why they want the 
guidance executed, civil servants should execute tasks as requested, unless the tasks are 
illegal. 
Weber (2012) also noted that civil servants should abide by the concept of 
“substantive rationality” (p. 185). In other words, civil servant bureaucrats should 
exercise good ethics as part of their work responsibility and realize that their actions may 
have consequences. Bartels (2009) noted that many critics of Weber’s theory of the ideal 
bureaucracy have cited the degradation of personal freedom as one of the issues with 
Weber’s views on bureaucracy. The critics’ concern has been that civil servant 
bureaucrats under the ideal bureaucracy concept must find a balance in following the 
prescribed rules and applying appropriate judgment. 
Bureaucracy theory has six main characteristics, as first explained by Weber. The 
six characteristics of bureaucracy are organizations managed by hierarchical structure, 
organizations with a heavy focus on management by rules, organizations whose leaders 
manage by functional specialty, organizations whose leaders focus on meeting their 
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organization’s higher mission or internal mission, organizations that are highly 
impersonal, and organizations whose leaders base employment on technical qualifications 
(Weber, 2012). Weber’s six characteristics of bureaucracy appear throughout the 
literature and serve as the theoretical foundation for research studies (Gargalianos, 
Asimakopoulos, Chelladurai, & Toohey, 2015; Mahmood, Basharat, & Bashir, 2012; 
Nhema, 2015). Weber’s six characteristics of bureaucracy are complementary to three 
other concepts he used when explaining bureaucracy: legitimacy, authority, and 
rationalization.  
Researchers have debated these three concepts of interest in recent literature on 
bureaucracy. Weber discussed legitimacy, authority, and rationalization extensively in his 
original works (Weber, 2012). De Vries and Nemec (2013) noted that the basis of 
legitimacy is the rule of law and constitutional principles. Kabbesa‐Abramzon (2012) 
asserted that legitimate power is equal to authority. Al-Habil (2011) and Weber (2012) 
noted that the three types of authority are traditional, legal or rational, and charismatic. 
Traditional authority is the result of power handed down from generation to generation. 
Rationalization refers to reasonable or sensible actions accepted by the governing law 
(Weber, 2012) and is one of Weber’s main concepts that serve as the basis of an 
effectively operating bureaucracy.  
Discussions about all three concepts—legitimacy, authority, and rationalization—
appear in detail in the literature and apply to current management practices. Labolo 
(2013) questioned the legitimacy of bureaucracy since the end of World War II. Other 
scholars such as Torsteinsen (2012), Al-Habil (2011), and Diefenbach and By (2012) 
33 
 
have contended that bureaucracy is just as legitimate in the 21st century as it has been 
since its inception. Al-Habil highlighted three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, 
and legal rational. Modern society’s bureaucracy is built upon the foundation of the legal 
rational authority approach. Those in leadership positions have achieved their status 
through normative rules and in a legitimate process. Hull (2012) cited authority as one of 
the defining qualities of bureaucracy. Aronovitch (2012) further analyzed and defined 
Weber’s four types of rationalization as rationalization to achieve an end, rationalization 
that requires no justification such as a traditional approach, rationalization based on 
emotions such as anger, and rationalization based on simply following automated 
customs. Taneja, Pryor, and Toombs (2011) echoed similar descriptions of Weber’s 
analysis on rationality. Parker and Ritson (2011) also noted that a large part of Frederick 
Taylor’s success was his ability to link much of his work to Weber’s theme of rationality. 
A great deal of Taylor’s work is traceable to Weber’s theme of rationality. 
The three concepts are the foundation for modern society and in many ways are 
the basis of laws practiced in many industrial and civilized societies. Laws in general 
have shifted away from a traditional familial approach to a rationalized approach (Alfasi, 
2014). In general, judges are rational, and at times they have to apply rational judgment 
when the rules are not clear (Broulík, 2014). Judges use rationale and do not make a 
decision simply because a rule does not address a situation. Bureaucrats may follow the 
rules or not take an action on a required task because the rules are unclear or ambiguous. 
The iron cage can sometimes trap bureaucrats. 
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 The iron cage is a subtheory that originated with Weber and is the result of a 
system of inefficient rules, such as a bureaucracy, that traps people. Because bureaucrats 
are eager to follow rules, they lose sight of rational approaches, which is one of the fears 
about which Weber cautioned other scholars. Weber believed that it would be easy to 
lose control of large organizations in which people did not apply rationale when 
implementing rules (Spicer, 2015). Following the rules when implementing management 
procedures is often necessary, but managers and bureaucrats must realize that following 
rules without adequate rationale may not always be in the best interest of an organization. 
Such examples include a news article on how school administrators used policy to 
dictate all their actions without using cognitive rationale (Roberts, 2012). According to 
Roberts (2012), teachers refused to allow two grade-school sisters to put on sunscreen 
because it violated school policy. The two girls subsequently received severe sunburns. 
Cognitive rationale would have indicated that the teachers or administrators remove the 
sisters from the sun, even if this violated school policy. Fayol, a management theorist, 
indicated such flexibility may be necessary and noted that his 14 management principles 
were ideals, and people should apply them only to situations where it makes cognitive 
rational sense (Schimmoeller, 2012). Fayol’s emphasis on flexibility could serve as a 
precursor of the postbureaucracy theory.  
Postbureaucracy Theory  
Scholars’ consensus on the effectiveness of postbureaucracy varies (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2015; Kanninen & Piiparinen, 2014; Mukokoma & van Dijk, 2013; Pollitt & 
Dan, 2013; Siltala, 2013; Verbeeten & Spekle, 2015). Some scholars support 
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implementing postbureaucracy initiatives (Bartels, 2009; Johnson, Wood, Brewster, & 
Brookes, 2009), while other scholars consider postbureaucracy to be a trend not fully 
proven and accepted within the community (Handel, 2013). Scholars opposing 
postbureaucracy contended that it could not compare to the effectiveness that 
bureaucracy has provided over several centuries. As a result of the ongoing debate 
occurring within the literature, researchers have conducted studies on postbureaucracy.  
Various scholars have analyzed postbureaucratic movements since the 1970s. 
Johnson et al. (2009) defined the theory of bureaucracy, cited examples of why many 
scholars support the concept of postbureaucracy, and noted the faults of bureaucracy. 
Johnson et al. noted that there is a general movement away from bureaucracy and toward 
implementing postbureaucracy initiatives. According to Johnson et al. and Diefenbach 
(2009), bureaucracy is not flexible enough to keep up with the current demands of the 
new global dynamic work environment. Postbureaucracy provides the nimbleness 
required to thrive in modern dynamic work environments. Postbureaucracy includes 
business- and market-oriented processes with a focus on metrics to develop results 
(Handel, 2013). Postbureaucracy initiatives take place through various applications.  
New public management is an application of postbureaucracy theory. In many 
government organizations, NPM is a practical application of postbureaucracy. This study 
includes an analysis of the literature of NPM implementation efforts across public 
organizations. The major theoretical propositions for the NPM, the postbureaucratic 
initiative, originated in the 1970s (Aykac & Metin, 2012). Christopher Hood first used 
the term NPM in the early 1990s (Christensen, 2012; Eckerd & Snider, 2017; Hansen, 
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Steen, & de Jong, 2013) and educated scholars about NPM as a management tool 
(Buschor, 2013; Handel, 2013). Although Hood used the term in the 1990s, the United 
Kingdom under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher led the way in 
implementing NPM in the early 1980s with the reform of the British National Health 
Service system (Pollitt & Dan, 2013). Many researchers documented the implementation 
of NPM initiatives within the British National Health Service system. 
The reform of the British National Health Service system became the symbol of 
NPM implementation under Thatcher (Bezes et al., 2012). During this era, government 
leaders seeking results-based management methods established NPM in response to the 
inability of leaders of large governments to respond to the needs of their people and keep 
pace with other organizations that could potentially provide the same services. As 
information became more available to people through technology and the Internet, 
competition increased, and the time to complete bureaucratic management tasks 
significantly decreased. 
Organizations’ hierarchical structures flattened under NPM implementation in an 
effort to improve the ability to respond in global market environments (Williamson & 
Snow, 2013). Other theoretical propositions include the need to increase profits mostly on 
the corporate side and the merging of hybrid organizations, which includes government 
and corporate organizations working together to meet the demands of government 




Rationale for Selection of Bureaucracy and Postbureaucracy Theories  
Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was one of two theories selected for this study. 
Government and U.S. Army leaders use bureaucracy as a tool to manage and control 
people and processes. The AAP has many similarities to bureaucracy. The AAP is 
frequently too slow, too structured, and ineffective in the globalized world.  
Postbureaucracy. Postbureaucracy is the second theory selected for this study. 
Postbureaucracy has similar characteristics as the ARAP. Due to rapidly changing 
management environments, many scholars have asserted that bureaucracy is out of date 
and no longer an effective way to manage (Bartels, 2009). Many of these scholars have 
supported the implementation of postbureaucracy and cited examples of implementations 
of postbureaucracy (Bartels, 2009; Cai & Wang, 2012; Swirska, 2014; Zia & Khan, 
2013). Others allege both can coexist, complement each other, and serve as an effective 
management tool (Emery & Giauque, 2014; Kletz et al., 2014; Lee, 2012; Santos Curto & 
Dias, 2014; Sturdy, Wright, & Wylie, 2014; Wiesel & Modell, 2014). Army leaders’ 
method for dealing with the inefficiencies of the AAP is to procure equipment through 
the ARAP. 
Army leaders using the ARAP procure items through the JRAC (DoD, 2012), 
REF (TRADOC, 2013), RFI (Department of the Army, 2009), or CDRT (TRADOC, 
2013). The four rapid fielding processes produce equipment quickly for soldiers, 
although there are many shortfalls. Like the postbureaucratic approach, the process is 
nimble, organizational structure is flatter, competition is better, and more flexibility is 
available to managers and supervisors. Drawbacks to the ARAP include producing 
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inferior equipment and failing to integrate the equipment fully into the Army’s overall 
equipment system, which further translates into the Army’s inability to support the 
equipment logistically via the ARAP.  
This study involved building upon existing theory and providing 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the ARAP. Park and 
Joaquin (2012) demonstrated that bureaucracy and postbureaucracy could coexist. The 
coexistence of the two theories indicates that managers can use both to organize their 
organization more efficiently to respond quickly to the constantly evolving requirements 
of soldiers (Park & Joaquin, 2012). 
This research linked postbureaucracy theory and the ARAP because 
postbureaucracy and the ARAP have many of the same characteristics. The ARAP 
requires responsiveness not available in the standard acquisition process. The acquisition 
process rarely meets the needs of soldiers within a reasonable time. The JTRS was one of 
many examples why Army leaders should consider embracing elements of 
postbureaucracy theory in the ARAP. 
The study also had close links to bureaucracy theory because bureaucracy and the 
AAP have similar characteristics. The results demonstrate that scholars and practitioners 
cannot completely disregard bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is necessary more for the AAP, 
which is a process that can take a long time to develop equipment. The equipment must 
meet the needs of harsh environments and remains in the inventory for decades. This 
equipment generally does not exist in the commercial market and takes a long time to 
develop in the technology maturation and risk reduction phases. For such equipment, the 
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bureaucracy approach is acceptable, and given the amount of money spent on such a 
program, bureaucracy is the right approach to ensure the proper development of the 
equipment. 
Other Management Theorists 
Henri Fayol. This study consisted of two theorists with complementary theories: 
Henri Fayol and Frederick Taylor. Fayol and Taylor were management theorists whose 
work complemented Weber’s. Fayol served as both a theorist and a practitioner because 
he documented both effective and ineffective management strategies over the course of 
his career while serving in various management positions (Peaucelle & Guthrie, 2012). 
Fayol’s works date back to the latter part of the 19th century.  
Fayol supported the concept of cognitive rationale, and he elaborated on 14 
administrative principles in his original work (Poudyal, 2013; Shakir, 2014). Before 
listing the key points of the 14 administrative principles, Fayol noted the principles were 
general guidelines and adjustable as needed by the managers implementing the principles 
(Schimmoeller, 2012). Managers who do not follow established rules or policies without 
sound rationale serve as an example of management theorists lacking cognitive rationale. 
Some critics referred to Fayol as inflexible (Schimmoeller, 2012). Fayol 
accounted for management flexibility in his preferences before explaining his 14 
administrative principles. Fayol was an appropriate choice for a management theorist in 
this study because his 14 administrative principles have stood the test of time. Fayol 
provided managers with advice for implementing the administrative principles so they 
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could use sound cognitive rationale and good judgment in the implementation of his 14 
administrative principles. 
Fayol believed in the concept of general management (Taneja et al., 2011). The 
general management approach supports the idea that a good manager can effectively 
manage any organization. Frederick Taylor supported the notion of technical 
management as a prerequisite to managing an organization effectively. According to 
Taylor, technical managers are better than general managers are because they know their 
occupation and can more effectively manage the organization. Master in business 
administration students once focused on principles of general management, but a more 
recent trend includes a shift toward management specialization. 
Frederick Taylor. Frederick Taylor was a popular theorist during his era and 
even more popular than Fayol in Fayol’s native France (Parker & Ritson, 2011). Taylor 
was the first major American management theorist, and he gained acceptance largely due 
to the United States excelling as a world superpower at the turn of the 20th century 
(Parker & Ritson, 2011). Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management (1911) was his 
most notable work. In Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor provided 
recommendations for measuring, taping, and recording, which are essential to 
establishing a baseline for efficiencies. Taylor believed in achieving efficiencies in the 
workplace. Taylor worked as a machinist and achieved most of his workplace efficiencies 
through standardization. Taylor built his works on the concept of standardization, much 
like the Roman Empire. Leaders of the Roman Empire relied on standardization to 
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manage their vast empire successfully and effectively (Hellman & Liu, 2013). Taylor and 
the Roman Empire relied heavily on standardization as an effective management tool.  
Taylor was an appropriate theorist for this study because governmental 
bureaucrats can still learn a great deal from Taylor’s original works on scientific 
management. Taylor focused on management efficiencies, which is a characteristic that 
governments lack in many areas. Part of Taylor’s success in the application of his works 
was his ability to link much of his work to the theme of rationality (Parker & Ritson, 
2011). This was also one of the cornerstones in Weber’s work. Much of Taylor’s work 
links to the theme of accepted rationality. 
Managers and scholars have applied the phenomena of management 
inefficiencies, lack of cognitive rationale, instability, and lack of long-term forethought to 
government and corporate management. Clegg (2012) conducted studies in education and 
noted the driving factor for interest in this phenomenon is the desire to reduce costs and 
expenses. Corporate managers must maintain competitive profits for stakeholders 
continuously, and managers in government must find ways to accomplish the same tasks 
with less funding due to reductions in government budgets. This study benefited from 
current research in the literature because reduced government budgets and increased 
efficiencies will be necessary to acquire equipment under the AAP. 
Conceptual Framework 
The following information serves as background on the AAP and helps to 
describe how the three systems depicted in Figure 2 support the AAP. Under the AAP, 
three separate processes must come together and work to acquire equipment for soldiers: 
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PPBE (DoD, 2013b), JCIDS (Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2012), and DAS 
(DoD, 2015). Figure 2 shows how the three systems should work. These three processes 
support the characteristics of bureaucracy theory. 
 
Figure 2. Three systems supporting the Army acquisition system. From The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (p. 6), by U.S. Department of Defense, 2013, retrieved from 
http://at.dod.mil/docs/DefenseAcquisitionGuidebook.pdf. Figure is in the public domain. 
 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution  
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution is a calendar-driven event 
designed to provide commanders in the field with the best mix of soldiers, equipment, 
and support within reason based on financial constraints across fiscal years (DoD, 
2013b). Figure 3 depicts PPBE. The planning phase indicates the capabilities needed to 
deter and defeat threats. The planning aspect involves considering the National Defense 
Strategy, policies, and other guidance for resources and capabilities to allow the U.S. 




Figure 3. Defense Acquisition System diagram. From Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) program managers tool kit (p. 20), by W. Parker, 2011, retrieved from 
http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/pages/tool%20kit.aspx. Figure is in the public domain. 
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The programming phase consists of aligning resources and transforming guidance 
to resource requirements such as force structure and money required to fund various 
efforts. Budgeting consists of developing a detailed financial plan, which results in 
leaders within the Office of Management and Budget issuing program budget decisions. 
Execution is the final phase and occurs simultaneously with the program and budget 
reviews. The execution phase involves conducting analysis to assess the effectiveness of 
resource allocation. 
Joint Capability Integration and Development System 
Leaders within the armed services must use JCIDS to develop the requirements 
documents for their branch of service (Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2012). 
Each service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) has a Maneuver Center of 
Excellence whose personnel conduct analyses that determine the doctrine for their service 
(DoD, 2013a). For example, personnel at the Field Artillery School in Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, are responsible for doctrine development and doctrine implementation for 
U.S. Army artillery equipment. Under the JCIDS process, the staff of each school’s 
Maneuver Center of Excellence generates and validates requirements for equipment.  
Subordinate to the Maneuver Center of Excellence is TRADOC, which serves as 
the change agent for amending doctrine. The JCIDS process generates three different 
documents that support the DAS under the acquisition approach or DAS. Those 
documents are the initial capability document, the capability development document, and 





Figure 4. Defense Acquisition System diagram. From Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2015, retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/500002p.pdf. Figure is in the public domain. 
 
Defense Acquisition System 
The DAS is a formal process managed by the DoD 5000-series directives (DoD, 
2015) and guides the development and delivery of equipment for the AAP. All the armed 
services acquire major equipment using the DAS. The AAP and the DAS are almost 
identical, with the exception of a few nuances that the U.S. Army requires for developing 
and delivering equipment specific to the U.S. Army. Likewise, the Navy and Air Force 
acquisition processes are almost identical to the DAS, with the exception of a few 
nuances specific to the Navy and Air Force. The DAS relies on PPBE and JCIDS. The 




Congress manages the acquisition process through functional areas. The 
functional areas plan and direct DAS, manage science and technology programs, 
formulate acquisition efforts, manage programs, conduct system engineering, conduct 
financial management, conduct procurement and contract management, perform 
acquisition logistics, conduct product support, manufacture and produce systems, and 
conduct tests and evaluations. The DAS diagram shown in Figure 4 illustrated each phase 
of the DAS.  
The DAS has major milestones, such as Milestone A, B, and C. Each milestone 
requires significant documentation for entrance and exit criteria. The U.S. Army procures 
each major piece of equipment through the process in Figure 4. The program 
management office responsible for the equipment staffs the required documentation 
through various agencies. The staffing of documents in the DAS is lengthy. The process 
starts with a materiel development decision to determine if a materiel solution can solve 
the issue. Assuming a materiel solution can solve the problem, the proposed equipment 
solution continues in the DAS by entering into the materiel solution analysis phase 
through Milestone A and eventually into the technology maturation and risk reduction 
phase (DoD, 2013a). 
The technology maturation and risk reduction phase involves developing a 
prototype. After the demonstration of technical specifications, the program transitions to 
Milestone B and enters the engineering and manufacturing development phase. Milestone 
B is the major milestone in DAS because it typically indicates the program has a high 
probability of succeeding, and soldiers might receive the equipment. Many programs do 
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not make it to Milestone B, despite making it to Milestone A and receiving adequate 
funding (DoD, 2013). 
In the engineering and manufacturing development phase, the equipment 
undergoes engineering to more detailed technical specifications and undergoes intense 
testing and evaluation. After the equipment meets all requirements in Milestone B, the 
program transitions to Milestone C and enters into the production and deployment phase, 
which involves producing the product at a very low rate and solving testing and 
manufacturing issues before producing the equipment at full rate. As a result of the 
PPBE, JCIDS, and DAS systems not effectively and efficiently meeting the needs of 
soldiers in combat, the U.S. Army established the four systems described next under the 
ARAP to meet rapid acquisition requirements (Whaley & Stewart, 2014). 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process: Postbureaucracy Efforts 
The CDRT, JRAC, REF, and RFI are all rapid acquisition processes designed to 
provide equipment to soldiers in an efficient and effective manner. The four processes 
share characteristics associated with the theory of postbureaucracy. A detailed description 
of the four processes follows. 
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition. The CDRT process is an 
ARAP initiative managed by TRADOC and occurs biannually. Personnel at TRADOC 
develop training and doctrine for the Army and publish various training manuals to 
instruct soldiers in their specific career field. The CDRT process involves surveying 
soldiers in combat environments on equipment procured through the ARAP (TRADOC, 
2013). Personnel at TRADOC assess the survey results and make recommendations on 
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what equipment should transition to a program of record managed under the AAP by a 
program manager. Management under the AAP is paramount because it includes funding 
and logistical support for the life of the program. Transitioning equipment to a program 
of record in the CDRT process can be difficult, but equipment transitioned to a program 
of record can significantly help soldiers. The CDRT process has been beneficial because 
some of the high-performing equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan transitioned to 
programs of record. Because program management offices manage the equipment, most 
of the equipment has undergone significant improvements such as increased performance 
characteristics and developing a mature logistics support plan. 
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. The JRAC is an organization that consists of 
representatives from all the armed services and that receives requests for equipment from 
commanders in the field in the form of joint urgent operational needs and joint emergent 
operational needs (Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2012). Personnel at JRAC 
prioritize numerous requirements requests, determine solutions, and allocate funding for 
the new equipment. The JRAC meets on a regular basis to review the requirement request 
documents in the form of the joint urgent operational needs and joint emergent 
operational needs. After the personnel select and prioritize the requirements, they fund 
the effort. The JRAC will then supervise contract negotiations and procurement of the 
equipment through other organizations, such as program management offices. 
Rapid Equipping Force. The REF is an Army organization managed by Army 
G-3, which is the tactical operations center of the U.S. Army. Established in 2002, the 
REF provides equipment to soldiers supporting the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan 
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(U.S. Army, 2014). The REF receives requests from commanders in the field through a 
document known as the REF 10-liner. Personnel at the REF assess the REF 10-liner and 
determine if they can find and field an equipment solution. The REF’s goal is to provide 
an equipment solution to the soldiers on the battlefield within 180 days (U.S. Army, 
2014). Personnel at REF analyze commercially available equipment to find an equipment 
solution. They may work with a vendor to improve the equipment before beginning 
contract negotiations to develop and procure the equipment. The REF personnel have 
established government contracting mechanisms to expedite equipment procurement. The 
REF has successfully developed equipment in support of both the Iraq and the 
Afghanistan wars. 
Rapid Fielding Initiative. The RFI, established in 2003, is an organization that 
rapidly outfits soldiers with the latest and most technologically advanced clothing and 
other personal equipment just prior to deployment in support of combat operations 
(Department of the Army, 2009). Most of the equipment developed and issued by the RFI 
is personal equipment such as protective goggles, advanced cold weather gear, and other 
personal advanced equipment tailored for specific combat environments. Program 
Executive Office Soldier personnel manage the RFI and receive RFI requirements from 
TRADOC on the needs of deploying soldiers. Commanders and soldiers can provide 
comments and recommendations on RFI equipment through the Program Executive 
Office Soldier website. Issuing RFI equipment leads to opportunities to provide feedback 
on the equipment. 
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Studies Relevant to the Army Rapid Acquisition Process 
The studies most relevant to this research project were research projects 
conducted by senior military officers in the U.S. Military Senior Service colleges. These 
individuals were seasoned leaders with extensive Army acquisition experience who were 
aware of the Army issues within their respective field. The studies selected are from 
acquisition professionals with extensive work and educational experience within the 
acquisition field. In particular, 10 studies related to my study: Baldauf and Reherman 
(2011), Pernin et al. (2014), Rasch (2011), Schwartz (2014), Solis (2011), U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (2011b), Whitson (2012), Whaley and Stewart (2014), 
Vinch (2012), and Riposo et al. (2014). 
Baldauf and Reherman (2011) analyzed the REF’s processes and the manner in 
which REF personnel responded to the urgent needs requested from soldiers during the 
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. The study was a case study with a literature review. Pernin et 
al. (2014) conducted a study on readiness reporting for an adaptive Army. The focus of 
the study was not the ARAP, although Pernin et al. recommended that the ARAP align 
more with the rapid changes to equipment requirements to facilitate a more accurate 
reporting system. Pernin et al. also drew from the lessons learned from the Afghanistan 
and Iraq Wars. 
Rasch (2011) conducted a study on the lessons learned from the ARAP since the 
start of the two wars in the Middle East. The study consisted of a literature review and 
focused on the systems and processes used to develop and acquire equipment through the 
ARAP. The study also included recommendations to improve the ARAP. Schwartz 
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(2014) conducted a study in which he looked at general reforms to the AAP in its 
entirety. Schwartz did not specifically mention the ARAP, but Rasch noted that the new 
DoD Instruction 5000.02, which manages both the AAP and the ARAP, encouraged 
acquisition leaders to use sound rationale and tailor acquisition processes to be as 
efficient as possible. Schwartz also described the Better Buying Power initiatives that the 
DoD acquisition executive has implemented to increase acquisition productivity for DoD 
acquisition organizations and industry partners that support the DoD.  
Studies by researchers for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011b) 
and by Solis (2011) were both government-sponsored and supported by original data. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office researchers provided recommendations to 
increase oversight of nonstandard equipment. The purchase of most of this equipment 
occurred through the ARAP. Solis provided recommendations on developing a more 
comprehensive ARAP strategy for procuring equipment. In a thorough literature review, 
Whitson (2012) emphasized the importance of planning for logistics when procuring 
equipment through the ARAP. Whaley and Stewart (2014) conducted a detailed study 
and provided recommendations on how to transfer some of the much-needed ARAP 
programs to programs of record that provide stable requirements and funding.  
Vinch (2012) conducted a study that included a recommendation that the leaders 
of all existing ad hoc ARAP organizations whose staff procures equipment formalize 
relationships among themselves and standardize practices to sustain this vital capability. 
Riposo et al. (2014) conducted a literature review study and analyzed the increase in 
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schedule time for numerous acquisition programs. Riposo et al. noted issues with the 
ARAP programs in obtaining sufficient contracting mechanisms to procure equipment.  
The results of the 10 studies indicated that the DAS must work in conjunction 
with the other two most senior processes: PPBE and JCIDS. All three systems operate 
independently and are more process oriented than focused on delivering equipment to 
soldiers. The researchers of the 10 studies also advocated for consolidating the numerous 
ad hoc independent organizations founded after 2001 in support of rapidly equipping 
soldiers during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. The authors of the 10 studies also called 
for Congress to allocate specific funding for rapid fielding initiatives. Limited funding is 
available, and Congress often takes money from other accounts and from other 
acquisition programs to fund ARAP initiatives (Rasch, 2011).  
The 10 studies listed above were relevant to this research project and related to 
the research questions. The studies related to the research questions because the 
researchers analyzed recent studies and events related to issues within the Army 
acquisition profession and made several recommendations to help improve the process 
that would lead to improving equipment delivery to soldiers. These key studies included 
reviews of other studies and reviews of the literature. Few researchers had collected 
original data. Most of the original data collection occurred through studies from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office.  
Literature Review of Key Variables 
 Scholars within the field of management have conducted a great deal of research 
on both bureaucracy and postbureaucracy. The overwhelming majority of the studies 
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conducted were qualitative. The variables commonly found throughout the literature 
associated with bureaucracy are legitimacy, authority, rationalization, and stability (Al-
Habil, 2011; Clegg, 2012; Gargalianos et al., 2015; Labolo, 2013; Mahmood et al., 2012; 
Nhema, 2015; Torsteinsen, 2012; Wihantoro et al., 2015). The recurring variables most 
associated with postbureaucracy are responsiveness and flexibility (Laurin & Wagner, 
2011). A discussion of the variables follows. 
 Legitimacy, authority, rationalization, and stability are the variables associated 
with bureaucracy and are at the cornerstone of research on bureaucracy (Al-Habil, 2011; 
Torsteinsen, 2012). These reoccurring variables surface frequently when researching 
bureaucracy. Researchers often link the variables back to Weber, who wrote a great deal 
about them. Even when modern scholars conduct research on bureaucracy, the variables 
legitimacy, authority, rationalization, and stability often surface, and some of Weber’s 
original works appear as the foundation for the researchers’ work. Many scholars have 
highlighted lack of responsiveness and lack of flexibility as variables they would like to 
see improved within the literature on postbureaucracy. 
 Managers have implemented postbureaucratic initiatives in many organizations to 
improve the responsiveness and flexibility of organizations managed under the general 
bureaucratic model (Park & Joaquin, 2012). In the public sector, NPM is a common 
postbureaucracy initiative that many organizational and government leaders have 
implemented to improve responsiveness and flexibility. The effectiveness of NPM is 
unclear and debated within the literature (Alonso, Clifton, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2015; 
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Buschor, 2013). Most scholars cited the short-term positive impact of NPM, but the long-
term effects remain unknown. 
  Scholars have acknowledged the effectiveness of NPM but have also conceded 
that the basis of its effectiveness is the foundation of an already existing government or 
professional workforce (Mukokoma & van Dijk, 2013). The collective themes that come 
from the literature seem to indicate a trend that management under a bureaucratic model 
is a precursor to the successful implementation of postbureaucratic initiatives such as 
NPM (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015; De Vries & Nemec, 2013; Pollitt, 2015). The stable 
methodical processes already established within bureaucratic organizations support the 
successful implementation of postbureaucratic initiatives. The literature further indicated 
that leaders of successful organizations have improved responsiveness and flexibility 
through a hybrid bureaucracy approach (Emery & Giauque, 2014; Sturdy et al., 2014). 
The hybrid bureaucracy approach consists of using the best variables of bureaucracy such 
as legitimacy, authority, rationalization, and stability with the best variables of 
postbureaucracy such as responsiveness and flexibility.  
The greatest strength of the scholars’ research approaches were the consistency of 
their findings, which repeatedly included the same issues and inefficiencies in 
management under bureaucracy (Bezes et al., 2012; Handel, 2013; Zafra-Gómez et al., 
2013). Further supporting the greatest strength was the findings by many of the scholars 
noting consensus on the instability of postbureaucracy initiatives after initial 
implementation (Buschor, 2013; Simonet, 2013a). Many organizational leaders are 
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implementing postbureaucracy initiatives to cope with bureaucratic management 
inefficiencies (Bezes et al., 2012; Handel, 2013; Zafra-Gómez et al., 2013). 
The greatest weakness of the studies was the lack of relevant quantitative studies. 
Quantitative studies include a level of rigidity, but I did not find studies on management 
inefficiencies that included this methodology in significant quantities. The lack of 
quantitative research can be concerning to critics skeptical of qualitative studies, as well 
as to those having concerns about evolving management practices. 
 Some scholars with works reviewed within this study approached the 
management phenomena of inefficiencies in an exploratory qualitative case study 
analysis (Baldauf & Reherman, 2011). Many of the scholars conducted literature reviews 
on the subject, in addition to case studies on the specific phenomenon. Literature review 
studies included Rasch (2011), Vinch (2012), Whaley and Stewart (2014), Whitson 
(2012), Riposo et al. (2014), Schwartz (2014), and Pernin et al. (2014). A few of the 
studies consisted of interviews from experts within their field, such as the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (2011b) and Solis (2011). These two studies included 
primary research data. The case study methodological approach selected for this study 
aligned with other studies conducted on bureaucracy theory, postbureaucracy theory, 
ARAP, and AAP. Most of these studies were qualitative, with the majority of them 
including a case study or literature review approach. 
Criticisms of Postbureaucracy 
Critics of postbureaucratic systems cited instability, lack of long-term experience, 
profit-driven motives, and metric-focused goals as liabilities for organizations whose 
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leaders implement postbureaucracy efforts (Buschor, 2013; Simonet, 2013b). 
Postbureaucratic organizations are at times unstable because of the constant transition of 
personnel in key leadership positions. These individuals might not have the requisite 
long-term experience to perform adequately in a new executive-level job. In addition to 
their lack of experience and their focus, profit is usually their main driver. Leaders of 
public sector organizations often function by making businesslike decisions in the best 
interest of the citizens and not in the interest of maximizing profits (Islam, 2015). 
Drechsler and Randma-Liiv (2014) noted much of the economic turbulence that 
occurred after the 2009 economic recession was attributable to several tenets of NPM, 
which is a specific application of postbureaucracy. Drechsler and Randma-Liiv noted that 
relaxed financial regulations contributed to the economic demise of the stock markets in 
the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western European countries. An unbridled 
economic spirit caused many issues due to the lack of appropriate regulations, 
decentralization of powers, and reliance on the private sector. 
Diefenbach (2009) cited some key criticisms of NPM based on years of research. 
Diefenbach noted NPM often replaces traditional values with an extreme focus on 
businesslike values of stakeholder interests, which can translate to an increase in profits. 
Diefenbach noted that managers’ desire to implement NPM is often selfish, and many 
managers intend to increase their power and control of an organization. Workers often 
suspect such motives, and increased workloads and stress often lead to decreased 
productivity due to workers’ lack of motivation and decreased work–life satisfaction. 
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Diefenbach (2009) and Siltala (2013) also noted that the constant change in 
organizations’ structure further creates bureaucracy. Kim and Han (2015) provided 
numerous case study examples demonstrating that constant changes within organizations 
have caused many organizational issues. Granstrand and Holgersson (2013) analyzed the 
issues associated with disassembling organizations. Warf (2013) conducted a study on the 
impact of the Internet in the age of deregulation of telecommunications. For example, 
leaders of telecommunications regulations agencies employed individual lawyer 
contractors and other legal support staff to engage in numerous legal deregulation battles. 
These lawyers fought many cases on behalf of telecommunications agencies, and after 
they finished the case, their contract ended, and the lawyers and other legal support staff 
moved on to other similar jobs. Many of the telecommunications agencies lost a great 
deal of historical knowledge because the company fought numerous court battles on 
deregulation, and letting the lawyers move on to other cases resulted in a loss of 
institutional knowledge for the company. The lawyers and other legal support staff often 
worked other cases within the large legal network of deregulation. The lack of focus on 
organizational structure led to a significant loss of money, time, and potentially 
intellectual property for some of the telecommunications agencies. 
Moynihan (2012) contended that the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina in 
2005 was a result of the newly established U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
absorbing the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The change in leadership and the 
new political appointment of people who lacked historical knowledge contributed to the 
embarrassing issues that unfolded as a result of the Hurricane Katrina response efforts. 
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 Researchers have applied and studied the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy within the management sector of both government and private sectors. 
The literature includes an ongoing debate in which researchers have questioned the 
validity of bureaucracy in comparison to postbureaucracy. Leaders have applied 
bureaucracy to established Western governments from their creation to the present. Many 
scholars have questioned the effectiveness of bureaucracy (Diefenbach & By, 2012; 
Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah, & Kyeremeh, 2015).  
Movement to Replace Bureaucracy  
Due to trending management changes since the late 1970s and early 1980s, there 
has been a movement to replace bureaucracy with postbureaucracy initiatives because 
some managers and scholars deemed bureaucracy outdated and inefficient to manage 
(Bartels, 2009; Diefenbach & By, 2012). Torsteinsen (2012), Al-Habil (2011), and 
Diefenbach and By (2012) contended that classical bureaucracy was still as relevant as it 
had been in years past.  
Sturdy et al. (2014) also contended that bureaucracy is still the foundation of 
management, even if leaders implement postbureaucracy initiatives. Park and Joaquin 
(2012) noted that bureaucracy can coexist with postbureaucracy. Diefenbach and By 
(2012) indicated that bureaucracy is the foundation of modern society and although not 
the most efficient form of management, it is effective and takes into account the concerns 
of the majority of people. Al-Habil (2011) noted bureaucracy is blind in execution. The 
written and unbiased rules of bureaucracy govern a nation or an organization. As a result 
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of the blind unbiased bureaucracy management tool, many people deem bureaucracy as 
impersonal. 
 Wihantoro et al. (2015), Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2015), Rosenberg (2015), Al-
Habil (2011), and Labolo (2013) contended that bureaucracy is impersonal, which may 
not be bad. Weber (2012) noted the impersonal management approach is one of the six 
characteristics of bureaucracy. An impartial tool should ensure the equal treatment of 
people, which bureaucracy supports through objectivity. Postbureaucracy includes 
attempts to consider the needs of each individual (Park & Joaquin, 2012), which can be a 
daunting task and can be a distraction for the effectiveness of postbureaucracy initiatives. 
The Spread of Postbureaucracy Initiatives 
Scholars have called for implementing postbureaucracy initiatives in many 
governments and corporate organizations as a response to global changes and as a result 
of technology and the Internet (Aykac & Metin, 2012; Major, 2012). Many scholars have 
specifically called for the implementation of NPM, which is an application of 
postbureaucracy principles (Colon & Guerin-Schneider, 2015; Haque, 2013; Lee, 2012). 
Leaders and managers in both developed and underdeveloped countries can see the 
benefits of NPM implementation. Postbureaucracy initiatives such as NPM 
implementation are a global phenomenon (Alonso et al., 2015; Francu, 2014; Goldfinch 
& Roberts, 2013; Kim & Han, 2015; Ortansa, 2012; Pollitt & Dan, 2013; Simonet, 
2013a; Swirska, 2014; Zafra-Gómez, Bolivar, & Muñoz, 2012; Zia & Khan, 2013). 
The United Kingdom was the first in a series of developed countries that 
implemented NPM in the 1980s (Pollitt & Dan, 2013). Norway also participated in the 
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implementation of NPM (Jantz, Reichborn-Kjennerud, & Vrangbaek, 2015). Germany 
was a late adopter of NPM in comparison to other European Union members (Manes 
Rossi & Aversano, 2015). France and Italy were also adopters of NPM due partially to 
European Union entrance requirements (Ongaro, 2012). Norway, Germany, France, and 
Italy have a hybrid mix of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy management approaches. 
The leaders within the countries still rely heavily on bureaucracy, which serves as a 
cornerstone of stability for their governing functions, but they also include NPM 
initiatives in some areas to keep pace with global workplace requirements. 
Scholars have noted that NPM is most effective in governments and organizations 
that already have some form of established professional workforce (Ashraf & Uddin, 
2015; De Vries & Nemec, 2013; Pollitt, 2015). These scholars noted the failure rate is 
high for continuing NPM implementation within organizations that lack a professional 
workforce. Mukokoma and van Dijk (2013) contended failure occurred in some African 
nations during the installation and management of various basic governmental programs 
such as water and sewer infrastructure. Data indicated that basic forms of bureaucracy are 
necessary for the successful implementation of NPM. Given the success of 
postbureaucracy initiatives in established governments, some governments have also 
moved toward implementing bureaucracy and postbureaucracy hybrid initiatives (Emery 
& Giauque, 2014; Sturdy et al., 2014). The data indicated that basic forms of bureaucracy 
are necessary for the successful implementation of NPM. 
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Bureaucracy and Postbureaucracy Hybrid Initiatives  
Like many of the European countries that adopted a few postbureaucracy 
initiatives such as NPM, some scholars support the notion of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy existing in a complementary manner or in a hybrid-type organization 
(Emery & Giauque, 2014; Sturdy et al., 2014). According to Park and Joaquin (2012), the 
George W. Bush administration set into motion NPM-centric initiatives. The 
postbureaucratic NPM initiatives included the strategic management of human capital, 
competitive sourcing of government services, financial performance improvement, and 
the implementation of electronic budget and performance integration tools. 
The George W. Bush administration also attempted to implement the Government 
Performance and Results Act in which numerous government agencies underwent 
evaluation on program purpose and design, strategic planning, program management, 
program results, and overall rating scores (Park & Joaquin, 2012). The administration did 
not consider it necessary to reject bureaucracy. The focus of the administration’s effort, 
like that of other nations, was to take the best of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy and 
merge the two to maximize efficiencies while creating stability for the near future. 
Kletz et al. (2014) cited other examples of hybrid management-type 
organizations. Sturdy et al. (2014) and Wiesel and Modell (2014) noted that NPM is the 
evolution of bureaucracy and contended that bureaucracy still serves as the foundation of 
postbureaucracy hybrid initiatives and other postbureaucracy initiatives. Bureaucracy has 
evolved and continues to evolve to keep up with new global market requirements. Clegg 
(2012) cited the use of project management teams to complete short-term work 
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assignments as an example of the evolution. Jałocha, Krane, Ekambaram, and Prawelska-
Skrzypek (2014) also highlighted the need for project management teams to understand 
the dynamics of postbureaucratic initiatives such as NPM to operate effectively in the 
management environment. 
Financial Database Incompatibility 
As the leaders of government-managed organizations continue to merge 
postbureaucratic organizations with bureaucratic organizations, particularly in 
government, there appears to be issues with finance accounting compatibility between 
various organizations (Laurin & Wagner, 2011; Sharma, Lawrence, & Fowler, 2012). 
These issues surface because bureaucratic organizations have different financial 
accounting practices than organizations operating under a postbureaucracy-like 
management style. In particular, Laurin and Wagner (2011) conducted a study on the 
Quebec employment services sector and described issues with accountability 
complexities mostly due to the incompatibilities in their financial database systems. The 
accounting issues occurred during postbureaucracy initiative implementation. More 
specifically, Laurin and Wagner labeled their postbureaucracy initiative results-based 
management a postbureaucracy initiative.  
Sharma et al. (2012) described how postbureaucracy financial accounting 
practices were incompatible with a nation’s bureaucratic financial approach. As a result 
of globalization, leaders of a Fiji telecommunications company had to embrace modern 
accounting practices to remain competitive in the telecommunications sector. Fiji’s 
homogenous population also influenced the Fijian telecommunications market. Like 
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many islands in the Pacific region, Fiji had limited influence from outsiders, and in the 
case of a Fiji telecommunications company, there was resistance to implementing the 
change. Although leaders implemented postbureaucracy changes, they did so with Fijian 
cultural principles in mind. Kim and Han (2015) noted the importance of cultural impacts 
when implementing postbureaucracy initiatives. Government leaders implemented 
postbureaucracy initiatives in the South Korean government and private sector with 
success. As in Fiji, changes were necessary to some of the postbureaucracy initiatives to 
meet the cultural needs of the country. 
Helden and Uddin (2016) examined financial database issues between 
government and corporate organizations, especially in emerging economies, and 
contended that financial leaders in emerging economies often attempt to implement 
accrual accounting as the standard for financial transactions between government and 
corporate entities, but accrual accounting procedures were not helpful in solving the 
incompatibility issues. Managers in the public sector often implement accrual accounting 
when implementing NPM initiatives (Buylen & Christiaens, 2014; Upping & Oliver, 
2012). The focus of accrual accounting is performance metrics. The leaders of many 
countries with postbureaucratic initiatives, such as NPM, must adjust their accounting 
and financial systems to complement the new postbureaucratic initiatives. Poland, 
Pakistan, China, and other countries with emerging markets have accounting 
methodologies that support postbureaucratic management initiatives (Cai & Wang, 2012; 
Swirska, 2014; Zia & Khan, 2013). 
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Gap in the Literature 
 A great deal of research on ARAP exists. However, there was a gap in ARAP 
research from various Army acquisition functional areas. The specific management 
problem was the gap in knowledge and understanding about ARAP. The evaluation of 
ARAP by a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area professionals 
narrowed this gap. The purpose of this study was to increase knowledge and 
understanding of the deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section 
of Army acquisition functional area professionals. The topics of the research questions 
for this study were the key problems of the current ARAP and the key factors that affect 
the performance of ARAP. Through the research questions, the study involved assessing 
the relationship between ARAP, bureaucracy, and postbureaucracy.  
Summary and Conclusion 
The major themes in the literature were Weber’s theory of bureaucracy, which 
included an analysis of rationalization, legitimacy, and authority. Also analyzed were 
Weber’s concept of ideal bureaucracy, the iron cage, and the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy. This chapter included an analysis of the hybrid management approach 
of both bureaucracy and postbureaucracy. The evaluation revealed the issues associated 
with multiple accounting databases as a result of mixing postbureaucracy initiatives with 
bureaucracy. The implementation of postbureaucracy initiatives such as NPM around the 
world has had mixed results. 
Researchers have written a great deal about the effectiveness of postbureaucracy 
initiatives compared to the effectiveness of bureaucracy. Considerable knowledge is 
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available on both bureaucracy and postbureaucracy, but whether postbureaucracy is the 
management tool of the future, especially in global markets, remains unknown. 
Bureaucracy creates stability within organizations, and postbureaucracy initiatives do not 
consider the importance of stability. 
Based on my review and critical analysis of the literature, researchers have 
conducted and published substantial research on the ARAP, but most of the literature is 
in periodicals or published as editorials. There are also published studies in which 
researchers conducted an analysis of literature already published in editorials. Limited 
research exists in which researchers collected firsthand data to support conclusions and 
make recommendations on ARAP. Because most of the existing studies are in non-peer-
reviewed periodicals, they do not have links to theories. Additionally, the ARAP 
literature lacks a broad cross-section perspective from Army acquisition functional areas. 
Most of the ARAP literature published is from the perspective of program managers. The 
state of research for ARAP requires more research linked to specific theories and a 
perspective from various other Army acquisition functional areas. 
 My research led to recommendations on how to improve the ARAP to gain 
efficiencies in acquiring ARAP equipment. The recommendations were to provide 
logistical and sustainment support for ARAP equipment, maintain regular contact with 
soldiers requesting ARAP equipment, allocate proper funding for ARAP program 
managers, and institutionalize ARAP training at Defense Acquisition University (DAU). 
This exploratory qualitative case study consisted of in-depth semistructured interviews 
from various Army acquisition professionals with extensive management and leadership 
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experience. The next chapter includes a discussion of the research questions and the 




Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 The purpose of this study was to increase knowledge and understanding of the 
deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals. The general management problem was that the ARAP is 
inefficient at delivering adequate equipment to soldiers. However, there was a gap in 
ARAP research from various Army acquisition functional areas. The specific 
management problem was the gap in the knowledge and understanding about ARAP. An 
evaluation of ARAP by a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area 
professionals narrowed this gap.  
This chapter includes a detailed description of the data collection process, the 
rationale for selecting the methodology, and the role of the researcher, as well as the 
justification for selecting participants. Figure 5 includes a step-by-step methodology 
overview concerning data collection. The chapter includes the rationale for selecting 
purposive sampling, field testing procedures, procedures for recruitment, and 
participation and data collection processes. This chapter also includes a discussion on 
instrumentation; data analysis; and the methods used to ensure trustworthiness, reliability, 
validity, dependability, and confirmability. The chapter concludes with ethical 
considerations addressed in the Institutional Review Board (IRB) application.  
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Questions 
RQ1: What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of equipment using the 
current ARAP?  
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RQ2: What key factors are present that impact the performance effectiveness and 
efficiency of ARAP and that could serve as a basis for developing improvements in 
equipment acquisition? 
RQ3: How do the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy align with and 
explain the ARAP?  
 
Figure 5. Step-by-step methodology overview. 
Research Central Phenomena 
This study involved addressing phenomena from the theory of bureaucracy and 
the theory of postbureaucracy, including NPM, which is an application of 
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postbureaucracy. The theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy helped to frame the 
study. The bureaucracy and postbureaucracy theories are well-defined, and researchers 
have written a great deal about these theories, although researchers have not studied 
postbureaucracy to the same extent as bureaucracy. Postbureaucracy requires additional 
research and development, as it emerged in the mid-1980s (Mukokoma & van Dijk, 
2013).  
The phenomena under study in the theory of bureaucracy include significant 
workplace production inefficiencies and lack of cognitive rationale when completing 
work tasks, especially large projects. Over the past few decades, the use of technology 
and the use of the Internet, which led to the expansion of information to almost every part 
of the world, have challenged the role of bureaucracy. Subsequent changes, such as the 
implementation of postbureaucracy initiatives, have led many organizational leaders to 
adjust their workforce management approaches to cope with changes in workplace 
environments. 
The phenomena under study in the theory of postbureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy initiatives are dynamism and lack of long-term forethought. Dynamism 
is the process by which management makes abrupt management changes (Dutta, 2014). 
The changes can be positive or negative. An association exists between NPM and 
instability and lack of long-term forethought. Because of the information age and the 
spread of technology, NPM has gained a foothold in many organizations as a means to 
cope with new workplace dynamics. The implementation of NPM has created instability 
in the workforce, at both a management level and a worker level. NPM initiatives often 
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require numerous iterations of management implementation, which create a significant 
amount of turbulence within organizations. New public management and other 
postbureaucratic initiatives create dynamism, as rapid changes occur with the aim of 
achieving results quickly. This unrest in the workforce negatively affects productivity and 
inhibits organizational leaders from focusing on their core mission. 
Lack of long-term forethought is the other phenomenon that leaders of NPM 
organizations often encounter. Many times, NPM efforts are too focused on the fiscal 
bottom line and immediate cost savings. The lack of focus on the long-term strategic plan 
for organizations can put them at risk and make them vulnerable to changes that 
organizational leaders are not able to manage. Such changes may severely degrade 
organizations and inhibit their ability to execute their primary business functions. These 
two phenomena required further investigation through a case study approach to ARAP 
systems. 
Research Tradition and Rationale for Selection of Tradition 
I selected the case study research tradition because of the complexity of the 
phenomena under investigation. Yin (2014) noted that case study researchers examine 
real-world contemporary phenomena and focus on answering questions of how and why. 
Yin further noted that case studies are beneficial when the number of variables or factors 
outnumbers the limited number of data points. Yin indicated that researchers commonly 
use case studies in many disciplines, including business, education, psychology, and 
political science. According to Yin, case studies are appropriate because they allow 
researchers to attain full, unabridged information on the attributes of real-life events. The 
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case study approach best aligned with the goals of this study because the study involved 
analyzing real-life events in which the numbers of variables or factors outnumbered the 
data points. The research questions within this case study led to answers that indicated 
why and how the phenomenon occurs as opposed to simply what the phenomenon is 
about. 
More specifically, this study was an exploratory case study because the research 
consisted of preliminary primary research within a field of study (Zogaj, Bretschneider & 
Leimeister, 2014). This study was an exploratory case study because the case study likely 
had no clearly defined set of outcomes (Zogaj et al., 2014). The study also entailed a data 
collection component that involved interviewing 15-20 Army acquisition professionals. 
The interview questions included specific questions that traced back to the main research 
questions, in addition to open-ended questions that illuminated themes and provided 
recommendations or ideas to help improve the ARAP. 
Under the case study approach, I used the interview protocol to approach the 
phenomena from multiple angles, and in doing so, I explored various perspectives from 
experts within the acquisition community with extensive work experience with the 
ARAP. These individuals provided diverse perspectives on ways to improve the ARAP. 
The case study approach also included the opportunity for participants to discuss other 
issues or concerns not covered in the interview protocol. The freedom to converse about 
other issues while employing the interview protocol further enriched data collection. 
Furthermore, by using the interview protocol under the case study approach, I was able to 
analyze body language as a form of nonverbal communication during the interview. 
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People transmit 60-70% of communication nonverbally (Gkorezis, Bellou, & Skemperis, 
2015). Astute researchers conducting interviews consider nonverbal communication as 
part of their data collection and data analysis. 
Role of the Researcher 
 Stake (1995) outlined the role of the researcher in at least nine functions: 
participant observer, interviewer, reader, storyteller, advocate, artist, counselor, evaluator, 
and consultant. In this case study, as the researcher, I served in the role of interviewer and 
evaluator. As the interviewer, I asked questions that addressed the research questions 
both directly and indirectly. Each question asked in the interview protocol traced back 
directly or indirectly to the three main research questions for this study. This study also 
involved evaluating the results of interview questions with the intent of exploring 
potential shortfalls of the ARAP. 
 I had a professional relationship with most of the participants and had worked 
with many in the past as a fellow Army acquisition professional. A few of the participants 
were former bosses. Despite the fact that I formerly worked for these participants, the 
research conducted will not have any impact on my career progression or work 
relationships with the study participants. Some of these individuals served as professional 
mentors. None of the study participants worked for me, and I did not possess any power 
or influence over them. Some study participants came as referrals from other acquisition 
professionals. These referrals resulted from the snowball sampling technique, as 
discussed further in the Sampling Description section. 
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 I managed bias by first acknowledging that as an Army acquisition professional, I 
had a bias for a process that operates more quickly and efficiently. An improved ARAP 
that brings equipment to soldiers is something that I have always desired. As a soldier, I 
have witnessed both the AAP and the ARAP on numerous occasions. I also mitigated the 
potential for researcher bias by ensuring that both research and interview questions did 
not have bias. All questions were objective, with no leanings toward a particular 
improved ARAP.  
 Conducting research on the AAP can involve ethical issues. Such issues can arise 
if interviewees are not in line and in agreement with the current process. The career 
progression of participants who publicly disagree with or publicly speak out against the 
process can slow tremendously. In an effort to mitigate such a possibility, I withheld 
participants’ identities by maintaining strict confidentiality during data collection and 
analysis.  
Methodology 
Participant Selection Logic 
The population for this study consisted of graduates of DAU, which certifies both 
military and civilian personnel in various acquisition workforce functional areas. There 
are three levels of DAWIA certification. To earn Level I certification, individuals must 
complete DAU entry-level classes and have a minimum of 1 year of experience in their 
functional area. Level II has all the same requirements as Level I and requires the 
completion of intermediate DAU classes. Level II personnel must also have a certain 
number of college credits within their functional area. Level III certification indicates 
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expertise in an individual’s functional areas. Level III certification indicates that the 
person has at least a bachelor’s degree in his or her functional area, has worked in a 
leadership position for 4 years, and has completed a capstone-level course in the 
functional areas.  
To ensure proper selection of study participants, member checks served to ensure 
that all the case study participants were DAWIA Level III certified in a particular 
functional area, with a few exceptions. Individuals who have a DAWIA Level III 
certification demonstrate a working knowledge of the AAP through other means such as 
extensive work experience with the AAP and the ARAP. There are exceptions. On rare 
occasions, DAWIA grandfathered some individuals based on the amount of time they had 
served in their functional area and before the formal solidification of DAWIA’s 
functional area designations. Such circumstances are rare but could have resulted in some 
study participants not possessing a DAWIA Level III certification.  
The sampling frame for this study consisted of DAWIA Level III professionals 
who were Army acquisition officers and Army civilians in the geographical vicinity of 
the mid-Atlantic area. The sampling frame consisted of Army acquisition professionals 
from various functional areas such as program management, contracting, test and 
evaluation, science and technology, and systems engineering. These functional area 
experts significantly affect both the AAP and the ARAP. Study participants were also 
from Army organizations that support the ARAP. Such organizations included the REF, 
Army Capabilities Integration Center, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
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Organization, Army Test and Evaluation Command, Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, and Army Research Lab. 
Individuals participating in this study had a DAWIA Level III certification in one 
of the following areas: program management, test and evaluation, systems engineering, or 
contracting. Individuals maintaining a DAWIA Level III certification are familiar with 
the AAP and have successfully demonstrated a high-level working knowledge of the 
ARAP. Study participants needed a minimum of 6 years of work experience within the 
Army acquisition community. Study participants also needed at least 2 years of 
experience working on an ARAP-supported program. This length of time in the Army 
acquisition community, in addition to the DAWIA Level III certification requirement, 
further validated the study participants as seasoned members of the acquisition 
community. Individuals with at least 6 years of acquisition experience had the requisite 
skills to serve as ideal study participants and to function as a representative sample from 
the ARAP acquisition population. The requirements within this paragraph served as the 
criteria to ensure that study participants had the proper qualifications to participate in this 
study. 
The sample size for this study was 19. I conducted interviews with the study 
participants until data saturation occurred. According to Fusch and Ness (2015), data 
saturation occurs when no new themes, no new information, and no new coding appear 
while interviewing study participants. Fusch and Ness also noted that data saturation 
occurs when the data collected are sufficient to replicate the study. After the study met 
the four criteria, I terminated the interviews. I gauged the four criteria by conducting data 
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analysis after each individual interview. Approximately 15-20 study participants were 
necessary to meet the criteria. If interviewing 15-20 study participants had not met the 
criteria, I would have increased the study participant population to 25. 
Fusch and Ness (2015) further noted that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to 
satisfying data saturation requirements. Researchers should strive to attain both rich and 
thick data in data collection for qualitative studies (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Fusch and Ness 
differentiated between rich and thick data and defined rich data as data quality and thick 
data as data quantity. Fusch and Ness recommended that qualitative researchers place a 
greater emphasis on collecting a balance of both rich and thick data to achieve proper 
saturation, as opposed to focusing on the specified number of study participants within 
qualitative studies. 
Milford et al. (2016) noted that samples in qualitative research are generally 
smaller than in quantitative research. Njie and Asimiran (2014) indicated that qualitative 
researchers focus more on ensuring the quality of samples than on establishing large 
samples. Some scholars have published general guidelines on case study participant 
numbers that serve as a rule of thumb, but the rule of thumb varies. Njie and Asimiran 
indicated that as few as one study participant may be suitable for a successful case study. 
Gentles et al. (2015) reported that sample sizes are heavily dependent on the depth and 
complexity of the interviews. Other scholars such as Merriam and Tisdell (2016) have 
reported that the basis of the sample is a study participant’s availability, research 
questions, data collection, and data analysis. Thus, there is no hard number required for 
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determining the number of case study participants, as long as saturation occurs (Fusch & 
Ness, 2015). 
Sampling Description 
The purposive sampling method was the primary strategy, and snowball sampling 
was a secondary strategy. Purposive sampling is a nonprobability sampling technique that 
is not representative of the sample (Gentles et al., 2015) but designed for a specific 
population with information on a specific research topic. Researchers must ensure the 
sample aligns with the research questions under investigation. 
Snowball sampling is a complement to purposive sampling. Snowball sampling is 
a technique in which study participants refer a researcher to other individuals eligible to 
participate in a study (Gentles et al., 2015). I asked study participants if they knew any 
other qualified individuals who would serve as good candidates and might be willing to 
participate in the study, and snowball sampling served as the means of identifying and 
recruiting four study participants.  
 Purposive sampling was an appropriate sampling technique because the 
individuals who could best answer the research questions were Army acquisition 
professionals. These individuals had a DAWIA Level III certification in their functional 
area, which ensured they had an in-depth understanding of their functional area in the 
AAP. Convenience or random sampling of the general population was not feasible for 




 This case study included an interview protocol as the primary data collection 
instrument. I developed an instrument that served as a tool for gathering data to answer 
the research questions for the case study. Some of the questions directly linked to the case 
study research questions, and other questions indirectly related to the research questions 
within the case study. Data collection is sufficient when themes repeat themselves in data 
analysis. 
Numerous studies and articles that detail some of the shortfalls of the ARAP 
served as a foundation for the interview questions. The researchers of these studies 
analyzed the problems of the ARAP and the AAP. The studies used to support the 
questions were Baldauf and Reherman (2011), Pernin et al. (2014), Rasch (2011), Riposo 
et al. (2014), Schwartz (2014), Solis (2011), U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(2011b), and Vinch (2012). 
 The instrumentation for this study consisted of four parts: interview protocol 
questions, e-mail solicitation letter, letter of consent, and an interview question review 
protocol. The interview protocol (see Appendix A) consisted of 16 questions, and the aim 
was to provide recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the ARAP. The e-mail solicitation letter included details on the study for prospective 
participants, including the purpose of the study (see Appendix B). The solicitation letter 
provided an overview of the study and served as a way to obtain individuals’ agreement 
to participate in the study. The letter of informed consent (see Appendix C) included a 
description of the study and of potential risks associated with the study. The letter of 
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consent also included a request that potential study participants sign the letter and agree 
to participate in the study. Field test protocol (see Appendix D) provides general 
guidelines on how Army acquisition professionals from DAU should assess and 
potentially provide recommended changes to the interview questions that I used to collect 
data for this study. The protocol provided instructions and background on this study for 
Army acquisition professionals reviewing the interview questions. The Army acquisition 
professionals from DAU reviewed, assessed, and provided recommendations on 
interview questions to support field testing for the interview questions. 
The interview questions were sufficient to answer the research questions because 
they were directly and indirectly traceable back to the main research questions for this 
study. The responses to the questions from the interview protocol helped to answer the 
main research questions of this study. The interview protocol began with questions to 
obtain demographic and background data from the study participants. The interview 
protocol then transitioned into questions on specific issues associated with the ARAP and 
recommendations on ways to improve the process. The interview protocol concluded 
with open-ended questions so the study participants could discuss any issues or concerns 
with the ARAP not covered during the interview. 
The interview protocol tool led to a few additional follow-on questions and to a 
few questions that required clarification. After conducting each interview, I wrote 
memos, reviewed my notes, and determined if study participants were providing adequate 
answers to the questions. Based on this assessment, I could have adjusted the protocol by 
adding more interview questions or by clarifying the interview questions.  
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Procedures for Field Test 
I conducted a field test on the interview questions prior to interviewing study 
participants. The field test ensured the reliability and validity of the interview questions. 
The field test included experts in the Army acquisition field who analyzed the questions 
to ensure they would be adequate to answer the research questions for the study. The 
experts conducting the field test consisted of two Army acquisition professionals with 
experience in both the AAP and the ARAP. I recruited the experts from the DAU and 
sent DAU professors a solicitation letter (see Appendix E) that included a brief 
description of the study and a copy of the interview questions. As a result of the field test, 
one of the acquisition experts recommended adjustments to the interview questions to 
ensure they would result in data that would be suitable for answering the research 
questions. After I received feedback from the DAU professors, and they agreed that the 
questions would be adequate to support this study, I proceeded with interviewing study 
participants.  
Procedures for Participant Recruitment, Participation, and Selection 
I interviewed 19 study participants identified through Army acquisition 
professional colleagues with whom I had previously worked. After analyzing prospective 
participants, consolidating a list, and evaluating credentials and participant criteria, I 
recruited potential study participants through e-mail. The e-mail contained a detailed 
description of the purpose and the intent of the study, as well as a project letter that 
included a request for them to participate in the study. A copy of the e-mail solicitation 
letter prospective study participants received is in Appendix B. 
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After I received an e-mail confirmation from prospective study participants, I sent 
them a study participant letter of informed consent (see Appendix C). They signed the 
letter of consent and sent it back to me prior to me conducting the interview. After I 
received the letter of consent, I set appointments for the interviews with the study 
participants.  
The first part of the interview questionnaire included questions on demographics. 
After the demographic questions, the interview questions shifted toward inquiring about 
the participants’ experience with the ARAP. These questions confirmed the study 
participants had the proper qualifications to participate in the study. Qualified study 
participants possessed a DAWIA Level III certification in a functional area. The criteria 
for qualified personnel appeared in the Participant Selection Logic section. Because many 
of the study participants selected were middle- to senior-level Army acquisition managers 
in organizations that often use the ARAP, all study participants had sufficient 
qualifications to participate in the study. However, when two of the study participants did 
not have sufficient qualifications, then I politely terminated the interview after the 
participants provided information on their lack of work experience with ARAP or their 
lack of a DAWIA Level III certification. 
Data Collection 
Data collection occurred through interviews. After the study participants agreed to 
participate in the study, I coordinated a time and a location to conduct the interviews. 
Most interviews took place in participants’ office or in a reserved conference room at 
their office location.  
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Interviews took place individually and lasted no more than 40 minutes. I recorded 
the interviews using an audio recording device. Data collection involved taking brief 
notes during the interview sessions. Near the end of each interview, I asked for 
permission to contact the study participants to follow up on any points requiring 
clarification. I also debriefed the study participants and asked them about any concerns 
they may have had about the information provided. I provided them my contact 
information and let them know that they could contact me if they needed to clarify any 
information or if they had any concerns about the information provided. 
Frequency of data collection depended on the availability of the participants. I 
conducted no more than three interviews per week. Collecting data through interviews at 
this rate allowed me time to compile notes and write memos. During the time between 
interviews, I organized and coded the data and prepared for data analysis.  
Member Checking 
To confirm the accuracy of the data collected during the interview, I sent the 
transcripts from the interview to the study participants in a process known as member 
checking. Harper and Cole (2012) viewed member checking through the lens of quality 
control that lends additional accuracy, validity, reliability, and credibility to interviews. 
The study participants reviewed the transcripts for content validity and ensured they felt 
satisfied with the answers provided during the interview. Participants who wished to 
provide clarification to their interview responses made updates.  
Member checking was suitable because study participants could provide 
additional information. It also provided participants with a high degree of confidence that 
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I interpreted their responses correctly. Through member checking, I assessed the study 
participants’ understanding of the interview questions and the intent of the study.  
Data Analysis Plan  
In this research project, I used memos, coding, and contact summary sheets as 
data analysis research strategies. Maxwell (2013) described the strategies of memos and 
coding in qualitative data analysis, as well as the strategies of contact summary sheets, 
codes and coding, pattern coding, and memoing as data analysis strategies. Memos, 
which are researcher observations, can vary in length and composition. The memos 
helped capture recurring themes, as well as what I learned from the interview. Through 
the memos, I was able to capture nonverbal communication, in addition to summarizing 
initial findings. The memo data-analysis technique was useful in the results section of the 
research study. Contact summary sheets are similar to memos, except researchers can 
preformat them to determine salient points and themes from the interview. Contact 
summary sheets also can serve as a quick reference for participants’ demographics. 
I also used coding, which is a process in which researchers systematically tag and 
categorize responses for future analysis. Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) described three 
phases of coding: (a) making the text manageable, (b) hearing what who said, and (c) 
developing theory. Researchers can use codes to identify themes in the data and to 
reference key parts of the data quickly for future analysis. Researchers can use coding to 
determine patterns within the data. Researchers also develop codebooks that serve as a 
reference guide for the codes they tag in their data. Researchers often write codes in the 
margins of interview transcripts or notes. 
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Coding can also link to the questions. In coding questions, researchers can 
organize or frame questions projected to answer a predetermined coding protocol known 
as precoding questions. I precoded some of the interview questions within this case study 
and directly or indirectly linked back to the overarching research questions of the study. I 
used NVivo 11 software as my qualitative data management software tool to organize, 
sort, code, and analyze my text-rich data. Through the software, I was able to identify 
relationships and trends within the data.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility  
Triangulation, member checks, peer review, and saturation served to establish 
credibility or internal validity. Triangulation involved two forms: data triangulation and 
investigator triangulation. Under data triangulation, I collected data through interviews 
from various functional area experts with experience in both AAP and ARAP. The 
functional areas included individuals with DAWIA Level III certifications in program 
management, test and evaluation, systems engineering, or contracting. 
I also triangulated interview data by collecting data from individuals who had 
worked or were working in various organizations or who had experience developing 
equipment for Army organizations. This case study consisted of participants from REF, 
Army Capabilities Integration Center, Army Test and Evaluation Command, Joint 
Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, Army Contracting 
Command, Army Research Lab, and various other organizations that support the ARAP. 
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Investigator triangulation took place through peer reviews of the transcripts. The peer 
reviews included other experts within the defense acquisition field. 
Transferability 
 I established transferability or external validity through thick description and 
variation of participant selection (Smiley, 2015). One implication of thick description is 
that it entails a detailed and rich description of the data. This is a partial definition of 
thick description. The rest of the definition is that thick description provides a contextual 
sense of the data collected. I determined the context of the data through noting study 
participants’ thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Thick description thus helps provide an 
improved context and perspective of study participants. 
For example, if a researcher were collecting data for a research project on death 
and dying, it would be prudent to annotate study participants who have a terminal illness. 
Study participants with terminal illnesses will likely have a unique perspective on death 
and dying. Thick data also include participants’ culture and overall intention (Smiley, 
2015). Because the AAP is such a multifaceted and complex process, the study included 
the thick description strategy to support the transferability or external validity of the data. 
The study included a variation of participant selection as described above by selecting 
study participants with different DAWIA functional areas. 
Dependability  
 Audit trails and triangulation serve to establish dependability. I transcribed the 
interviews to establish an audit trail, and I organized the coding notes in the margins of 
the transcripts neatly for future reference. Additionally, I constructed and organized 
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memos and contact sheets for future reference. These documents directly traced back to 
the transcripts. The ability to cross reference the interview transcripts, memos from the 
interviews, and contact sheets further helped to establish the dependability of the study, 
as did triangulation. Triangulation occurred when similar themes surfaced from the 
transcripts, memos, and contact sheets. 
Confirmability 
 Confirmability occurred when using the concept of reflexivity (Anney, 2014). 
Reflexivity is the technique by which researchers realize their own personal history or 
personal feelings that may influence the research under investigation. In an effort to 
counter reflexivity, I informed readers of my own personal biases with the AAP and the 
ARAP. I believe the AAP can benefit from some process improvements such as 
streamlined initiatives. Although I have biases with the AAP and the ARAP, I did not let 
my biases interfere with the ethics of this study. 
Ethical Procedures 
 I ensured that I followed all required ethical procedures through the IRB. This 
study included the following documents from the IRB: solicitation e-mail, letter of 
consent, interview questions, and a coding data protocol memo of instruction. A Walden 
University representative provided IRB Approval No. 06-09-16-0129608 for this study 
after granting approval. I coordinated with the Army Research Institute and the Army 
Human Resource Protection Office to gain permission to collect data. Ethical concerns 
included ensuring none of the study participants were under my supervision. Also, study 
participants recruited to participate in the study could not benefit in any significant 
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manner that might influence data collection or the results of the study. I did not supervise 
or work for any of the study participants. 
Study participants received information indicating that participation in this study 
was not a requirement. I notified them that there would be no penalty for deciding not to 
participate in the study, even if they changed their mind before the study began or at any 
time during the study. If a study participant had decided not to participate in the study, 
then I would have destroyed all data collected from that study participant immediately. 
I treated all data collected as confidential. The study did not include names and 
identifiable information. Some of the data collected appear in this study as coded data. 
The raw data collected will remain in a lockbox in my house for 5 years after collection. 
After 5 years, I will destroy the data. I will destroy all other data after the publication of 
the study. I will erase electronic data from hard drives and thumb drives and shred paper 
data.  
Summary 
 This chapter included a description of the methodology for this research study, the 
role of the researcher, and the purposive selection of study participants. This chapter also 
included a description of the nature of the study, the procedures for the field test, 
participant recruitment, data collection, and data analysis procedures. The chapter also 
included a discussion on instrumentation use; the data analysis plan; and tools used for 
determining the trustworthiness, reliability, validity, dependability, and confirmability of 
the data. This chapter concluded with the ethical procedures followed during the study.   
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Chapter 4: Results  
 The purpose of this exploratory case study was to increase knowledge and 
understanding of the deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section 
of Army acquisition functional area professionals. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present the results of the study. This chapter includes discussions on the field test, setting, 
demographics, data collection, data analysis, results, and evidence of trustworthiness, 
concluding with a summary. 
In this study, I examined the problem of the gap in knowledge and understanding 
about the ARAP by evaluating a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area 
professionals with experience working with the ARAP. The three research questions 
developed to evaluate the ARAP were as follows:  
RQ1: What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of equipment using the 
current ARAP?  
RQ2: What key factors are present that impact the performance effectiveness and 
efficiency of ARAP and that could serve as a basis for developing improvements in 
equipment acquisition? 
RQ3: How do the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy align with and 
explain the ARAP? 
Field Test 
 The study included a field test to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
interview questions. The field test included experts in the Army acquisition field who 
analyzed the questions to ensure that they were adequate to answer the research 
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questions. Two DAU professors analyzed the interview protocol and the proposal. One of 
the DAU professors recommended that I add a question to the interview protocol that 
asked study participants to distinguish between the AAP and the ARAP to provide 
context and to help study participants to differentiate between the two processes. Based 
on the DAU professor’s recommendation, I added a question. The other DAU professor 
accepted the interview protocol and had no recommended changes.  
Research Setting 
I recruited study participants from my professional networks within the Army 
Acquisition Corps. I conducted the interviews in accordance with the protocol. Study 
participants did not identify any changes in their occupation status that would affect the 
results of the study.  
Demographics 
This study consisted of participants from the Army acquisition community. I 
recruited study participants from the Army Acquisition Corps. I contacted the study 
participants via e-mail and requested their participation in accordance with the protocol 
outlined in Appendix B. Study participants who agreed to participate in the study signed 
the letter of consent (see Appendix C). I coordinated time and location and conducted the 
interview at each study participant’s convenience. The interviews took place at the 
person’s place of employment and restaurants. 
The study participants’ demographics are in Table 1. Of the 19 study participants, 
15 were civilians, and four were military officers. Fourteen were military veterans. Seven 
served in Iraq or Afghanistan, one served in Kosovo, and one served in Vietnam. Fifteen 
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participants had over 10 years of work experience in the acquisition community. Two had 
between 1 and 9 years of work experience in the acquisition community, and two had no 
previous jobs in Army acquisitions but had adequate experience working with the ARAP. 
Table 1 















Level III DAWIA 
functional certification 
Current acquisition 
job (functional area) 
SP1 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Not certified Requirements 
SP2 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Engineering  Engineering  
SP3 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Test and evaluation, 
science and technology  
Test and evaluation  
SP4 Military Yes Yes Over 10 Engineering Engineering 
SP5 Civilian Yes Yes Over 10 Program management Program management 
SP6 Civilian No No Over 10 Program management 
and engineering  
Engineering 
SP7 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Test and evaluation, 
program management 
Test and evaluation  
SP8 Military Yes Yes Over 10 Program management Program management 
SP9 Civilian No No Over 10 Contracting  Contracting 
SP10 Civilian No No Over 10 None Science and 
technology 
SP11 Military Yes Yes Over 10 Program management Program management 
SP12 Civilian No No Over 10 Program management, 




SP13 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Engineering Science and 
technology 
SP14 Civilian No No Over 10 Engineering and 
contracting 
Contracting 
SP15 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Test and evaluation Test and evaluation 
SP16 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Program management Program management 
SP17 Military Yes Yes 1-9 Program management Program management 
SP18 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Test and evaluation Test and evaluation 
SP19 Civilian No Yes Over 10 Not certified Requirements 
 
The study consisted of a vast cross-section of Army acquisition professionals. 
Study participants were DAWIA Level III certified in program management, science and 
technology, contracting, test and evaluation, engineering, and logistics. Study participants 
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worked in various jobs within the Army acquisition community, including program 
management, requirements management, science and technology, contracting, test and 
evaluation, and engineering. Table 1 depicts the demographics of the participants.  
Data Collection 
 I collected data from 21 study participants through semistructured interviews (see 
Appendix A) from July 29, 2016, through November 4, 2016. I analyzed the data from 19 
of 21 study participants. Two of the study participants did not demonstrate a true mastery 
of the AAP and the ARAP, and I did not use their data in the study. Twenty interviews 
took place face-to-face. I conducted one interview over the phone. Eighteen interviews 
took place at the person’s place of employment, and the other three took place in 
restaurants. I recorded 19 of the interviews using a digital recording device to ensure the 
accuracy of the data. I later transcribed the data. I did not record two interviews because 
electronic devices were not permissible in the participants’ office locations. 
 The interviews ranged from 25 to 40 minutes each. All study participants 
answered the interview questions in accordance with the interview protocol (see 
Appendix D). The 19 study participants whose data underwent analysis demonstrated 
extensive knowledge of the AAP and the ARAP. I encountered no issues or difficulties 
regarding data collection.  
 Within the study, there were three study participants who were not DAWIA Level 
III certified. Their current acquisition jobs did not require Level III certification. Two 
study participants were from the acquisition requirements functional area, and both had 
over 10 years of experience within the acquisition community. The other study 
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participant worked within the science and technology community functional area and had 
over 30 years of experience in the acquisition community. Despite the three study 
participants lacking DAWIA Level III certification, they were considered acquisition 
experts with qualifications to participate in the study. 
Data Analysis 
 I organized the data from the semistructured interviews using NVivo 11. The 
coding process used to assist in developing themes followed the procedures used by 
Maxwell (2013). Coding categories led to determining themes though reoccurring 
phrases, ideas, topics, and concepts. I first started categorizing the data into large bins 
using the open coding concept described by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014). After 
categorizing the data using this technique, I was able to organize the data so that I could 
begin to identify developing trends. The emergence of trends enabled me to organize the 
raw data and further organize the data into themes.  
 Entering codes into NVivo facilitated the development of common themes. I 
completed five iterations of analysis to ensure that the organization of the data collected 
was optimal. Memos were written during and after each interview to analyze the data and 
to analyze each study participant individually. In the memos, I captured nonverbal 
responses that also assisted with data analysis. I identified 10 themes during my analysis. 





Coding and Themes 
Codes Categorization Themes 
ARAP team Current key issues Equipment sustainment 
ARAP undefined Risks of using ARAP Equipment transition  
Change in field needs Risk mitigation vs bureaucracy Equipment funding  
Cooperation collaboration support ARAP capture lesson learned Requirements  
Disposition analysis ARAP future revisions Direct soldier involvement  
Enduring capability  Negotiations with stakeholders 
Execution or follow-through  Bureaucracy reduces risk  
Initial stages work well  Postbureaucracy increases risk 
Lead times   AAP well defined  
Logistics and test data  ARAP not well defined 
Policy - bureaucracy   
Politics   
Program managers   
Transition process   
Votes and input   
Delivery timeline   
Enduring capability   
Funding   
Mission support   
Operational testing   
Safety   
Training and manuals   
ATEC reports   
Continuity of information   
Logistics   
Operational requirements - feedback   
Outcome analysis   
R&D - prototypes   
Stakeholders   
Strategic vision   
Sustainment and transition   
TRADOC   
CDRT process   
Collaboration   
Contracting   
Define the problem   
Delivery   
Documentation   
End user   
Enforce execution of process   
Input - feedback   
Integrated systems   
Policy - regulations   
Resources   
Science projects - banish or test 
Senior level involvement 
  





































Codes Categorization Themes 
Sole source acquisition process 
Stakeholders   
Streamlining process   
Threat assessment   
Training operational needs statement   
Vetting process   
REF perspective 
Senior leader support involvement   
Sustainment   
 
Discrepant Cases 
 There were no significant discrepant cases discovered during this study. Study 
participants reviewed their transcripts and made the necessary adjustments. Five of the 19 
study participants provided minor edits to the transcripts. The transcript reviews and 
minor adjustments to the transcripts ensured that the data collected from the study 
participants were accurate. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
 In an effort to ensure credibility, I applied member checking to verify the data 
collected and to ensure that there was no misinterpretation of the data. Study participants 
were also aware of the emerging results of the study. To ensure credibility further, data 
collection and analysis included memo and field notes. In an effort to curtail bias, I 
acknowledged my preferences, issues, and concerns with both the AAP and the ARAP. I 
also established credibility through triangulation. Themes extracted from the data 
collected demonstrated triangulation because numerous study participants repeated many 




 The intent of this case study was not to transfer findings (Maxwell, 2013). The 
intent of this case study was to increase knowledge and understanding of the deficiencies 
of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional 
area professionals. The small sample size of 19 study participants limited transferability.  
Dependability 
 The concept of redundancy helped to address dependability. Dependability 
occurred when study participants provided similar responses to the same questions 
(Trotter, 2012). Dependability was also demonstrated through triangulation in which 
similar themes surfaced from the transcripts, memos, and contact sheets. Digitally 
recording interviews, transcribing the interviews, and composing memos during the data 
collection process also enhanced dependability. 
Confirmability 
 I addressed confirmability by using coding matrices and memos. Data from 
transcribed interviews supported this study. To mitigate personal bias and to ensure a 
well-rounded understanding of the results of this exploratory case study, study 
participants reviewed their interview transcripts for comments, and I informed them of 
the emerging results.  
Study Results 
 The results of this study yielded themes that aligned with the research questions. 
The alignment of the research questions with the themes is depicted in Table 3. The study 
results are organized by research questions with corresponding themes. In the remainder 
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of this section, I describe the results of the study based on the data collected from 
participants. 
Table 3 
Themes From Interviews and Data Aligned With Research Questions 
Research questions Themes 
RQ1: What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of 
equipment using the current ARAP? 
Equipment sustainment, equipment 
transition, equipment funding  
RQ2: What key factors are present that impact the performance 
(effectiveness and efficiency) of ARAP and that could 
serve as a basis for developing improvements in 
equipment acquisition? 
Requirements, direct soldier 
involvement, negotiations with 
stakeholders 
RQ3: How do the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy 
align with and explain the ARAP? 
Bureaucracy reduces risk, 
postbureaucracy increases risk, AAP 
well defined, ARAP not well defined 
 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 was as follows: What key problems have surfaced in the 
acquisition of equipment using the current ARAP? Three themes emerged from the 
qualitative analysis in response to RQ1 and the study problem statement: sustainment, 
equipment funding, and equipment transition. Explanations of the three themes follow. 
Theme 1: Equipment sustainment. Sustainment was the most common of all 
themes and surfaced throughout most of the study. Sustainment also surfaced as the most 
common problem with ARAP, according to study participants. Fourteen of the 19 study 
participants noted the problem of sustainment.  
Study Participant (SP) 11 and SP16 were from the same organization, and they 
both indicated that the ARAP had performed exceptionally well since 2001, while 
supporting the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Army acquisition professionals managing the 
ARAP do a good job at delivering equipment to soldiers at the front end of the process 
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according to SP2 , but SP16 noted that the ARAP’s biggest weakness is its ability to 
sustain the equipment. SP4 also noted that the Army acquisition professionals who 
manage the ARAP do a good job of initially delivering equipment to soldiers as quickly 
as possible. Because most of the ARAP equipment lacks a sustainment plan, SP12 and 
SP17 indicated that soldiers often abandon the equipment and do not use it. SP11 
provided an example of a unit whose leaders had to either pay for the sustainment of a 
critical piece of equipment that they needed or put the equipment away in storage. The 
unit made the tough decision to pay for the equipment using funds allocated for other 
critical assets. 
According to SP3, no one manages sustainment and the costs associated with 
sustainment. SP6 discussed the high cost of contractor logistics support that program 
managers often purchase for 1 or 2 years with ARAP-procured equipment. SP14 echoed 
similar concerns. After the contractor logistics support expires, soldiers put the 
equipment away in storage and do not use the equipment again, unless the unit purchases 
an expensive sustainment packaged for the equipment.  
SP8 noted that logisticians often do not have a voice in the development of 
equipment under the ARAP model. Furthermore, when someone consults them on an 
ARAP product in development, it is often too late because the development of the 
equipment is complete. Because operations and sustaining equipment are the highest 
costs of equipment, SP8 indicated that Army acquisition logisticians spend a significant 
amount of money sustaining or maintaining the equipment. The ARAP lacks a clear 
logistics picture because no one conducts the proper reliability testing to inform the 
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logistics or sustainment plan. Involving logisticians early on could help better inform the 
sustainment plan. 
SP8 recalled a project that required his team to upgrade the obsolete internal 
components of an equipment set procured under ARAP. SP8 was serving as the program 
manager for the equipment set at the time and realized the previous design of the 
equipment did not support a sound logistical plan to assist in maintaining the equipment 
set. In upgrading the internal components of the equipment set, SP8 empowered his lead 
logistician to serve as a key voting member of the working group upgrading the internal 
components. SP8 acknowledged that the design of the equipment under the guidance of 
his lead logistician resulted in significant cost savings and a sound logistical plan 
supported by the Army supply system. 
SP10 discussed the lack of common logistical strategy as an issue for many 
ARAP programs. SP11 cited the mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles 
purchased under ARAP as an example. Because numerous contractors produced the 
multiple types of vehicles in a short time frame, a sound logistical strategy to support the 
vehicles was lacking. Because the vehicles were not all the same, maintaining the 
vehicles was a challenge and expensive. 
Theme 2: Equipment transition. Equipment transition surfaced as a problem 
with ARAP among many study participants. SP1 and SP4 noted that the ARAP delivers 
equipment effectively, but the equipment does not always transfer to an enduring 
program or a program of record under the AAP. SP5 noted that there is typically not a 
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plan to transition equipment or to determine if the equipment can transition to an 
enduring capability.  
SP11 stated that transitioning equipment to an enduring program can be a 
challenge. The equipment transfers with no money to support the program. The ARAP 
equipment is then competing for money from other programs procured under the AAP. 
The money for the AAP is timed and phased for a specific program 5 years out, and 
adding an ARAP program misaligns funding or reduces funding for programs under the 
AAP. For this reason, SP13 indicated that program managers managing AAP programs 
are reluctant to accept ARAP programs into their portfolio.  
Theme 3: Equipment funding. Equipment funding emerged as a problem with 
the ARAP. Theme 3 indicates the need for funding and the need for the right kind of 
funding. Army acquisition community funding includes different types of funding for 
specific purposes. For example, procurement funding is strictly for procuring equipment 
and typically has a 3-year shelf life. Research development testing and engineering 
funding is for developing and testing equipment. This funding generally has a 2-year 
shelf life. Operations and maintenance funding is to maintain and build infrastructure on 
installations. Very few organizations have the necessary funding or the right mix of 
funding to develop, test, and procure equipment. SP1, SP11, and SP16 identified the need 
for flexible funding or a need to have the right mix of funds. The REF is one of the few 
organizations with the right mix of funding. Program managers within the REF procure 
most of their equipment under the ARAP, which is different from most program 
management offices. Most program management offices have procurement and limited 
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research development test and engineering funding and most of it serves to support 
enduring programs developed under the AAP.  
SP16 also noted that there is a lack of funding set aside to develop prototypes. 
SP16 asserted that making more prototypes will allow leaders to determine the feasibility 
of procuring future equipment though testing and to facilitate more hands-on use by 
soldiers. SP16 also advocated prototyping equipment in deployed areas through three-
dimensional printing.  
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was as follows: What key factors are present that impact the 
performance effectiveness and efficiency of ARAP and that could serve as a basis for 
developing improvements in equipment acquisition? Three themes emerged from the 
qualitative analysis in response to RQ2 and the problem statement: requirements, direct 
soldier involvement, and negotiations with stakeholders. A discussion of the three themes 
follows.  
Theme 1: Requirements. Requirements was one of the key factors that impacted 
the performance of ARAP. Requirements means defining what equipment is necessary, 
the equipment specifications, or the technical specifications required for the equipment. 
Defining the requirements was a theme that SP7, SP12, and SP13 noted as a shortfall of 
the ARAP. SP7 said that the ARAP lacked a process for “requirement degeneration or 
requirement decomposer,” and SP12 described the “lack of requirement vetting and no 
one decomposes the requirement and analyzes what [equipment] is needed.” SP7 and 
SP12’s comments indicated the lack of analysis involved in determining the requirements 
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that will determine what equipment soldiers need. SP13 also noted, “We do not do a good 
job of defining the [requirements] problem up front. We must identify the exact 
requirement and not gold plate the requirement.” Gold plating in this case referred to 
defining equipment requirements beyond what is necessary.  
Locking down the requirement can be difficult because of the evolving threat. 
SP15 asserted, “There is a struggle to lock down the requirement and approve the 
requirement” in part due to the rapidly evolving threat. SP6 further clarified that 
requirement managers within the Army must “determine the real threat, how long the 
threat will be out there, and who identified the threat” to define the requirement. SP18 
discussed his concerns with requirements, stating, “The problem is that there is no 
overarching architecture that is driving all of these systems to look at requirements and 
then decide what functions and capabilities filters down and to find out what all these 
requirements are.” SP18 recommended a top-down approach by Army leadership to 
define and prioritize requirements.  
Theme 2: Direct soldier involvement. Under this theme, study participants 
described the issues associated with not having adequate direct soldier involvement while 
using ARAP as an issue that decreases ARAP’s performance. SP12 noted there is a “lack 
of relationship with the end user.” That relationship involves communicating with the end 
user or the soldier on a regular basis to ensure the equipment under development 
continues to align with what the end user needs or with requirements. SP7 recommended 
that program managers discuss the progress of the equipment with the end user or soldier 
at least weekly to ensure no significant changes are necessary. SP7 further noted that this 
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approach is important, especially in the engineering phase where changes to the 
equipment could affect the fit, form, and function of the equipment.  
SP13 echoed the issue of soldiers’ participation in the requirement process to 
assist in understanding the requirements by stating that Army acquisition professionals, 
specifically program managers, “must do a better job of involving the operational Army 
up front in the development of rapid acquisition. As the product is engineered, there is 
not enough involvement/interaction with the end user.” SP15 supported the notion of 
soldier involvement, especially when the soldiers are deployed and for collecting data on 
prototype equipment.  
There is at times a desire to bring in the user representative and not the user when 
developing equipment under the ARAP. User representatives develop the theory and 
concepts of operations on how soldiers should employ equipment. From an Army 
doctrine perspective, user representatives have the responsibility of developing 
requirements for soldiers. The end users are the soldiers requesting the equipment and 
will eventually receive the equipment, typically using the AAP. The user representative 
and the user are sometimes at odds on the equipment needed. SP7 noted the frequent lack 
of a “knowledgeable user or user representative to tell the material developer [program 
manager] what they [soldiers] really need.” SP7 indicated that user representatives’ 
operational experience is out of date, and they may not have the latest operational 
experience required to assess the requirements needed for the equipment. Given the 
difference in opinion between the two, the requirements community must resolve these 
issues to improve ARAP performance. 
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Theme 3: Negotiations with stakeholders. This theme appeared throughout the 
study as a way to improve the performance of ARAP. As the ARAP remains essentially 
undefined, as noted by SP17, it is typically new to key stakeholders who play an 
important role in designing and developing the equipment. Furthermore, program 
managers must often negotiate with stakeholders while using the AAP as the baseline. 
The biggest stakeholder that requires the most negotiations is the test community. SP12 
noted testers want to test everything. SP12 described the “inability of the test community 
to demonstrate flexibility. There is still a desire within the test community to test the 
performance parameters instead of testing the equipment to see what it can or cannot do 
[from an ARAP perspective].” 
SP4 stated,  
The [ARAP] process is always a negotiation, there’s always the process that will 
you go back and forth. This can be confrontational in a good way because you 
work though figuring out what’s minimal and what’s optimal, for example the 
level of testing required. Minimally, what’s required is a safety release, but the 
test community has negotiated, and their minimum is the capability and limitation 
report/assessment, in addition to the safety certification. The capability and 
limitation simply tell the soldier what the equipment can and cannot do, which is 
watered down from the requirements of the traditional acquisition process. It’s a 
balance. You work with your tester. It’s a give-and-take process in order to get to 
the best product for the soldier. We don’t always do everything or test everything 
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that the tester wants to test. We assume some risks in some areas that testers are 
not comfortable with. 
Although most negotiations with stakeholders center on testers, SP11 discussed 
issues with other organizations that did not have the infrastructure or knowledge to 
support rapid acquisition initiatives under ARAP. SP11 noted that when developing and 
procuring equipment, the leaders of organizations whose personnel manage spectrum 
management and public health requirements are slow to grant approvals and do not 
recognize the urgency required to develop and procure equipment under ARAP.  
Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 was as follows: How do the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy align with and explain the ARAP? Using qualitative analysis, four 
themes emerged in response to RQ3 and the study problem statement: bureaucracy 
reduces risk, AAP well defined, postbureaucracy increases risk, and ARAP not well 
defined. A discussion of the four themes follows.  
Theme 1: Bureaucracy reduces risk. Under this theme, six study participants 
acknowledged that bureaucracy in general reduces risk and is akin to the AAP. Army 
leaders often emplace rules that require more checks and balances, specifically in the 
AAP or traditional acquisition process. As it relates to Army acquisition, SP8 noted that 
in the AAP, every stakeholder has a chance to vote and to vote often. The AAP includes 
everyone to ensure a reduced risk. SP4 discussed bureaucracy as a way to reduce the risk 
and stated that under the AAP, “Typically someone has identified a problem, and some 
additional layer of oversight, to help mitigate that risk. . . . Over the years and all the 
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checks and balances . . . causes things [to] get unwieldy at some point.” SP12 further 
cited the DoD 5000.02 as the chief document that establishes acquisition rules that help 
manage or reduce risk. SP9 also supported the notion that, in the AAP,  
Bureaucracy a lot of times tends to decrease risk, because you are adding 
additional layers and checks and double checks into a system. So, there is a fine 
balance in risk mitigation. I can do something 100% but is the 95% solution 
acceptable? That’s part of my job is to balance risk in the contracting area, 
knowing is the amount of risk tolerable or not. 
 Other study participants noted that, while operating under the AAP, the amount of 
documentation required to acquire equipment is high due to added bureaucracy and the 
desire to accept risk is low. SP14 and SP6 discussed the concept of risk and articulated 
that when soldiers are not in a deployed environment, then the AAP process undergoes 
more scrutiny and the process slows down significantly, specifically as it relates to all the 
programmatic documents required. SP14 further noted that the tolerance for risk is more 
acceptable in deployed environments than when soldiers are not in deployed 
environments. 
Theme 2: Postbureaucracy increases risk. In contrast to bureaucracy, 
postbureaucracy involves more risk and aligns more with the ARAP. According to SP11 
and SP14, to deliver equipment to soldiers under condensed timelines, commanders must 




When we have a rapid initiative [ARAP], the bureaucracy is decreased. Because 
we know that there is an urgent and approved requirement, so the bureaucracy is 
mitigated or kept in check to support the soldiers. The risk of not meeting the 
schedule is decreased because the existence of bureaucracy is decreased. The user 
[soldier] still, however, accepts some of the risk through what he agrees to in the 
capabilities and limitations report. 
SP14 further noted that the tolerance for risk is more acceptable in the deployed 
environment than when soldiers are not in a deployed environment. 
Theme 3: AAP well defined. The AAP serves as the foundation of the ARAP. 
The AAP is well defined in the DoD 5000.02 and in the DoD 5000.02. SP8 noted it 
documents programs as they move through various milestones. The design for much of 
the documentation is to reduce risk, which aligns with the theory of bureaucracy. SP17 
also noted how well defined the AAP process is in comparison to the ARAP. SP17 
further noted that the focus of the AAP is on scalability and therefore it must be very well 
defined to support the design, production, and sustainment of equipment. SP6 indicated 
the AAP must be a well-defined process because it produces equipment that will be in the 
Army inventory for 20 years and beyond.  
Theme 4: ARAP not well defined. The notion that the ARAP is largely 
undefined was prevalent throughout the study. Lack of a true ARAP definition aligns 
with the theory of postbureaucracy. SP8, SP10, SP17, SP18, and SP19 expressed this as 
an ARAP characteristic. SP8 noted, “There could be a couple different definitions of 
107 
 
what rapid acquisition means.” SP17 stated, “Rapid acquisition is not a clearly defined 
term.” SP19 specified, “Rapid Acquisition is really undefined.”  
SP8 further acknowledged that if the ARAP was “institutionalized,” then it may 
not be rapid. The undefined aspect of the ARAP allows program managers the autonomy 
to deliver equipment to soldiers. Institutionalizing the ARAP may harm its effectiveness. 
SP8 indicated institutionalizing rapid acquisition may not be the most effective way to 
deliver equipment to soldiers. SP8 noted rapid acquisition provides loose guidance on 
how to deliver equipment to soldiers, which may be the most productive way to deliver 
equipment to soldiers. 
SP18 supported the loose definition of ARAP. SP18 further stated, “We need to 
think outside of the box and cannot have preconceived ideas.” SP18 alluded to the notion 
that ARAP, as largely undefined, provides flexibility for creative program managers with 
good judgment to go out and develop equipment for the soldiers. SP4 noted that it would 
not be easy for program managers to develop and deliver equipment to soldiers under the 
ARAP because it is relatively undefined. SP4 further noted that negotiating with those 
stakeholders to deliver equipment to soldiers can at times be confrontational, but it is the 
interest of delivering equipment to soldiers that may ultimately save lives. According to 
SP4, confrontation is necessary to get the best equipment for soldiers in the timeliest 
manner.  
Other Key Themes 
Lessons learned but forgotten. Some study participants acknowledged that 
leaders within the Army learned lessons over time but forgot the lessons along the way. 
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SP5 recapped some of the conversations with World War II veterans from the 10th 
Mountain Division, where they learned how to mitigate extreme-cold-weather injuries. 
Many of those same World War II soldiers served in the Korean War just over a decade 
later and they had to learn many of the same lessons again to alleviate cold weather 
injuries.  
SP13 echoed similar discussions regarding experiences during the Vietnam War. 
SP13 said that many of the lessons learned from a tactical perspective were some of the 
same lessons learned in the current Afghanistan War. SP13 further noted the difficulty of 
capturing the lessons learned and applying them later so that soldiers do not have to 
“reinvent the wheel.” SP13 gave credit to the individuals within government 
organizations that do an exceptional job of collecting data on the lessons learned but 
noted that accessing and applying the data had been difficult. SP8 noted similar concerns 
as SP13 mentioned regarding applying the lessons learned. SP8 noted that data on the 
lessons learned exist, but the current culture does not support applying those lessons 
learned, and until there is a culture that embraces reflecting on lessons learned, 
government organizations will continue to collect unused data. 
Mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP). MRAP is the premier product 
acquired under ARAP. Five of the 19 study participants noted MRAP was the “poster 
child” of ARAP. In fact, many authors have written about MRAP and documented how 
the DoD, including the Army, procured the MRAP. Friedman (2013) conducted a recent 
case study documenting the MRAP under the ARAP. The MRAP provided exceptional 
protection for soldiers, but had challenges from a logistics and a quality control 
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perspective. SP11 noted controlling quality was difficult because program managers 
procured the vehicles so quickly and through so many different vendors. SP11 witnessed 
instances in which the measurements of the MRAP did not match the manufacturer’s 
specification, which created issues when loading MRAP on aircraft and ships for 
transport. SP10 attributed many of the MRAP logistical issues to managing the various 
subvendors from the numerous models of MRAP. Ensuring quality equipment and 
ensuring timely delivery to soldiers were the two priorities when developing MRAP, so a 
sound logistical strategy became a secondary goal. As a result, maintaining the MRAP 
fleet has cost the DoD a significant amount of money. 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS). 
Four of the 19 study participants discussed the needs for Commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) to increase the speed of delivering 
equipment to soldiers. COTS refers to equipment available from any commercial 
company, whereas GOTS refers to equipment developed by a government agency and 
available for sale or distribution on a limited basis. SP11 and SP16 both attributed their 
speed of delivering equipment to soldiers to using COTS and GOTS. Typically, COTS 
and GOTS require little if any modification and are available for testing quicker than 
equipment that program managers had to engineer, prototype, and test. SP2 
acknowledged that significant modifications to the COTS and GOTS slow the process 
and limit a program manager’s ability to deliver equipment to the soldiers in a timely 
manner. SP10 and SP18 also expressed concerns with the reliability of the COTS and 
GOTS equipment delivered to the soldiers.  
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Themes by Acquisition Functional Areas 
 This study involved assessing ways to improve the ARAP from a broad cross-
section of Army acquisition functional area professionals. Table 4 depicts themes and 
aligns the themes with the functional job of each study participant. Based off the data 
collected, all functional area acknowledged the need for improved sustainment and a 
need to understand the requirements. All but two functional areas indicated the need for 
more direct soldier involvement with the program manager when developing and 
procuring the equipment. Engineers, program managers, requirement managers, and 
science and technology professionals discussed the need for a transition plan for ARAP 
equipment. Program managers, requirement managers, science and technology 
professionals, and test and evaluation professionals noted that ARAP remains largely 
undefined, while the contractors, engineers, program managers, and science and 












Theme Alignment of Acquisition Functional Areas 




technology Test and evaluation 
 9a 14 2 4 6 5 8 11 12 16 17 1 19 10 13 3 7 15 18 
Funding        x  x  x   x     
Transition    x  x   x x  x   x     
Sustainment  x  x x x  x x x x x  x  x x  x 
Requirements  x   x    x   x   x  x x x 
Direct soldier 
involvement 
    x x x  x  x    x  x x x 
Negotiations with 
stakeholders 
   x   x x x           
Rapid acquisition 
undefined 
   x   x    x  x x     x 
AAP defined    x   x    x         
Bureaucracy 
reduces risk 




 x   x               
a Numbers in this row refer to the study participants. 
 
Summary 
Through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area 
professionals, this qualitative exploratory case study involved exploring three research 
questions. Table 3 showed the research questions aligned with the themes for this study. 
The focus of RQ1 was on the key problems with the acquisition of equipment using the 
current ARAP, and the three themes that aligned with RQ1 were equipment funding, 
equipment transition, and equipment sustainment. The focus of RQ2 was the key factors 
that impact the performance effectiveness and efficiency of ARAP, and the three themes 
associated with RQ2 were requirements, direct soldier involvement, and negotiations 
with stakeholders. The focus of RQ3 was how the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy align with and explain the ARAP, and the four themes associated with 
RQ3 were bureaucracy reduces risk, postbureaucracy increases risk, AAP well defined, 
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and ARAP not well defined. This chapter also included other themes found within the 
data. Chapter 5 includes discussions, conclusions, and recommendations for future ARAP 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Purpose and Nature of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to increase knowledge and understanding of the 
deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals. The problem examined in this study was the gap in the 
knowledge and understanding about the ARAP, which was addressed through an 
evaluation of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area professionals 
with experience working with the ARAP. This study includes recommendations to 
improve the development and procurement of equipment under the ARAP.  
 The study’s methodology consisted of an exploratory case study with 
semistructured interviews. The qualitative approach was suitable to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the issues associated with the ARAP. The focus of the qualitative 
approach was on the richness and quality of the data and not on the number of 
participants (Yin, 2014). The findings from the study built on the foundations of 19 study 
participants, validated through triangulation and member checking. 
 This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 included an overview of the study 
and the problem statement. Chapter 2 contained a literature review bounded by the 
theoretical and conceptual framework. Chapter 3 included an outline of the methodology 
of the study, and the focus of Chapter 4 was data collection and data analysis. This 




Interpretations of the Findings  
Three research questions framed this study: 
RQ1: What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of equipment using the 
current ARAP?  
RQ2: What key factors are present that impact the performance effectiveness and 
efficiency of the ARAP and that could serve as a basis for developing improvements in 
equipment acquisition? 
RQ3: How do the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy align with and 
explain the ARAP? 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 was as follows: What key problems have surfaced in the 
acquisition of equipment using the current ARAP? The data collected in the study 
indicated that there are problems when acquiring equipment under the ARAP. Some of 
the problems associated with acquiring equipment under the ARAP revealed by study 
participants during the data collection process mirrored some of the problems published 
within the literature. The key themes supporting RQ1 were equipment funding, 
equipment transition, and equipment sustainment.  
Equipment sustainment. The theme of sustainment appeared throughout the 
literature and appeared as the top theme within this study from study participants. Within 
the study, the terms sustainment and logistics were interchangeable. Many of the study 
participants highlighted a lack of focus on a coherent logistical plan to support the 
equipment acquired under the ARAP. Within the literature, the study participants’ 
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concerns aligned with themes within the literature. Whitson (2012) noted the importance 
of planning for logistics, and many of the study participants noted that lack of planning 
was a widespread concern. Whaley and Stewart (2014) also noted that because of a lack 
of a sound logistical strategy that integrates ARAP equipment into the Army’s logistical 
system, Army leaders waste money buying civilian contractor logistics support, and some 
of the study participants also indicated that this was a concern. Williams et al. (2014) 
discussed issues associated with integrating logistics with equipment using the ARAP 
model.  
Equipment transition. The theme of transitioning equipment to a program of 
record or transitioning equipment to an enduring capability was the second theme that 
surfaced with many of the study participants. This theme also tied back to the literature. 
Whaley and Stewart (2014) highlighted the need for a plan to transition equipment 
procured under the ARAP to a program of record. Having a plan to transition or not 
transition allows program managers to allocate funding for ARAP equipment 
transitioning to programs of record, as indicated by the study participants and by Whaley 
and Stewart. The plan to not transition ARAP programs allows Army leaders to divest of 
the equipment and store equipment for potential future use if needed. 
Equipment funding. The theme of equipment funding also appeared in the 
literature as an issue, but not in the same manner in which it surfaced in the results of this 
study. In the literature, equipment funding appeared as Congress not setting aside money 
specifically for ARAP initiatives; most of the money that funds acquisition initiatives 
comes from other programs (Rasch, 2011). The equipment funding issues that surfaced in 
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this study centered on the inflexibility of the funding that Congress appropriates for 
program managers to manage ARAP initiatives. More specifically, program managers do 
not have the right type of money to use for the intended purpose. For example, program 
managers need research development, testing, and engineering money to design, develop, 
and test equipment, and in many cases, they have too much procurement funding that 
typically is only usable for procuring equipment.  
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was as follows: What key factors are present that affect the 
performance effectiveness and efficiency of the ARAP and that could serve as a basis for 
developing improvements in equipment acquisition? The data collected in the study 
provided factors that impact the effectiveness and efficiency of the ARAP. Study 
participants revealed that some of the factors involved with acquiring equipment under 
the ARAP during the data collection aligned with some of the problems published within 
the literature. The key themes supporting RQ2 were requirements, direct soldier 
involvement, and negotiations with stakeholders. 
Requirements. The theme of requirements appeared both in the literature and in 
the results of this study. Within the literature, Whaley and Stewart (2014) underscored 
the importance of ensuring that program managers have a stable requirement to deliver 
equipment to soldiers. Study participants indicated that leaders within the Army had 
significant difficultly defining requirements and had trouble not changing the 
requirements after their development was complete. Within this study, the participants 
acknowledged that the Army does not have an established procedure to decompose and 
117 
 
understand the requirements provided to them from soldiers in deployed locations. 
Because acquisition professionals within the Army do not fully understand the 
requirements and have not decomposed the requirements, some of the equipment 
developed is not sufficient to meet soldiers’ needs.  
Study participants also noted that the requirements are often evolving. The 
evolution of the requirements is due in part to enemies changing the threat and to soldiers 
changing their minds on the type of equipment they desire. The enemy changing its threat 
or the way in which it operates is normal, but soldiers changing their minds on what they 
want is not always expected. This change is often the result of soldiers not understanding 
what they want and at times simply wanting something different after they have had time 
to assess the enemy’s tactics more effectively. 
Direct soldier involvement. Direct soldier involvement is a theme not reflected 
in the literature but reflected in the results of this study. The fact that the theme did not 
appear in the literature does not negate its importance as a key factor contributing to the 
efficiency and effectives of ARAP initiatives. I presume that not finding direct soldier 
involvement in the literature was an oversight based on the limited body of research that 
exists. Direct soldier involvement essentially requires effective communication, which is 
one of the key tenets of effective leadership according to DuBois et al. (2015). The study 
participants who acknowledged the importance of direct soldier involvement focused 
their discussions on the need to ensure that program managers maintained regular 
communications with the soldiers as they developed and tested their equipment. Direct 
involvement such as regular weekly meetings, as recommended by one study participant, 
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would keep the user directly involved and communicate any potential issues with the 
equipment or any changes in the requirements.  
 Not reflected in the literature, but reflected in the study results, study participants 
distinguished between direct involvement with the soldier and not the soldier 
representative. Direct involvement with the soldier entails regular communications with 
soldiers in a deployed environment about the status of their ARAP initiatives. Direct 
involvement with the soldier representative entails direct communication with soldiers or 
civilians representing the soldiers’ needs, who can at times approach solutions from a 
theoretical perspective. Their tactical experience may also be out of date. Study 
participants advocated for direct soldier involvement with soldiers in deployed areas in an 
effort to receive direct feedback and the latest combat operational insight.  
Negotiations with stakeholders. Negotiations with stakeholders was not a theme 
found in the literature, but it appeared in the results of this study, mainly from a test and 
evaluation perspective. Because ARAP as a concept is loosely defined, and the body of 
research on the ARAP is limited, the fact that negotiations with stakeholders does not 
appear as a theme in the research is not alarming. As noted by some of the study 
participants, negotiations with stakeholders, specifically the test and evaluation 
stakeholders, are necessary to develop and test equipment under rapid initiatives. 
According to some of the study participants, the test community’s responsibility is to test 
the equipment to the fullest extent and under the most extreme conditions, but under 
rapid acquisition initiatives, such testing is not always necessary due to the time and 
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funding required for those tests. To mitigate the possibilities of overtesting, negotiations 
with test stakeholders are essential. 
Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 was as follows: How do the theories of bureaucracy and 
postbureaucracy align with and explain the ARAP? The data collected in the study 
provided insight on ways in which the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy 
aligned with and explained ARAP. Some study participants provided views on the 
theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy as they relate to risk. The data collected 
from the study participants did not necessarily align with some of the themes published 
within the literature. There is a great deal written in the literature on the theories of 
bureaucracy and postbureaucracy, but not much is available that specifically aligns with 
ARAP. The lack of data and lack of support in the literature links to the methodology of 
this study. Exploratory case studies, as defined by Zogaj et al. (2014), consist of 
preliminary primary research within a field of study. This study meets that criterion. 
Despite the lack of themes in the literature, study participants provided comprehensive 
insight on ways in which the theories of bureaucracy and postbureaucracy align with and 
explain the ARAP. The key themes supporting RQ3 were bureaucracy reduces risk, 
postbureaucracy increases risk, AAP well defined, and ARAP not well defined. 
Bureaucracy reduces risk. Some participants indicated that bureaucracy reduces 
risk. Program managers operating under the AAP manage programs of record or enduring 
capabilities that support using bureaucracy as a risk-reduction tool. Some study 
participants noted that under the AAP, all the stakeholders have a vote on developing the 
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equipment, which serves as a risk-reduction tool to ensure that soldiers receive the best 
equipment with the best possible performance and the safest equipment that is logistically 
supportable. Because of the well-documented approach to developing equipment under 
the AAP, study participants noted that the AAP is well defined. 
AAP well defined. Many of the study participants mentioned this theme in the 
interviews. Many acknowledged that the AAP is well defined in comparison to the 
ARAP. Although the DoD 5000.02 is the document that that guides the development and 
procurement of equipment, and it provides guidance on both the AAP and the ARAP, the 
focus of most sections of the DoD 5000.02 is on the AAP, which supports the notion that 
the AAP is well defined.  
Postbureaucracy increases risk. The notion that postbureaucracy increases risk 
received strong support throughout the study. Program managers typically focus on cost, 
schedule, and performance. Schedule and performance are often the focal areas in 
developing and delivering equipment to soldiers. Program managers must deliver 
equipment that meets adequate performance specifications, and program managers must 
meet schedules and deliver equipment to soldiers in a timely manner under the ARAP. 
Because schedule and performance are so important, risk is more acceptable under the 
ARAP. Commanders in the field, especially in deployed environments, are more likely to 
accept increased risk and receive equipment not yet fully tested to understand the 
performance of the equipment as long as it meets the schedule. The urgency in the need 
for equipment supports the appetite for increased risk and drives all stakeholders to 
operate more within the framework of a postbureaucratic construct. 
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ARAP not well defined. Many of the study participants noted this theme. As the 
ARAP is not well defined, it provides program managers the flexibility to define a plan to 
deliver equipment to soldiers, and program managers must educate and negotiate with 
stakeholders on their input for developing the equipment. Program managers must also 
tailor the ARAP for their specific needs and decide which stakeholders can vote. 
Limitations of the Study 
 Two limitations in this study were small sample size and transferability. 
Limitations to this study existed due to the small sample size of 19 study participants. 
This case study included an exploratory case study methodology, which is not 
transferable to a larger population.  
 Although I attempted to mitigate bias through member checking and 
triangulation, it is difficult to eliminate all bias. Member checking and triangulation 
techniques helped to increase the validation of data. As a military officer, I have over 10 
years of experience working with both the AAP and the ARAP, and based on my 
experience, I do favor one over the other. I believe that there was bias in some of the 
study participants’ responses based on their experiences, especially in the case of study 
participants with combat experience under the ARAP. A few of the study participants 
exhibited a great deal of passion when responding to the interview questions.  
Recommendations 
Recommendation for Action 
Army leaders should consider the recommendations of this study to improve the 
ARAP. Throughout this research study, I provided an assessment of the ARAP using a 
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cross-section of Army acquisition professionals. Although the United States has been at 
war for 15 years, the current world order of events indicates that the U.S. Army will 
continue to be part of future dynamic conflicts that will include the ARAP. The results of 
this study include four recommendations to improve the ARAP. 
Recommendation 1: Logistical and Sustainment Support for ARAP Equipment 
 My first recommendation is to mandate logistical and sustainment support for all 
equipment procured or developed under the ARAP. Based on the findings in this study 
and the themes uncovered in the literature, logistical support of equipment developed and 
procured under ARAP is lacking. As noted both in the literature and by the study 
participants, soldiers often do not use the equipment after it breaks because logistical 
support is not available after the small window of sustainment support expires. The 
equipment often goes into storage, and units forget about it. Furthermore, considering 
logistical support as an afterthought is often expensive and consumes a large part of 
program managers’ budgets.  
Recommendation 2: Maintain Regular Contact With Soldiers Requesting ARAP 
Equipment 
 My second recommendation is to mandate that program managers develop 
equipment under the ARAP to maintain regular contact with the soldiers requesting the 
equipment. This regular contact facilitates communications between the two, and it will 
ensure that program managers meet the needs of the soldiers requesting the equipment. A 
program manager may receive guidance to develop a piece of equipment with certain 
parameters on Day 1. At Day 275, when the program manager contacts the unit to deliver 
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the equipment, the unit may no longer be in a deployment environment, or the threat in 
the area where the soldiers operate may have evolved such that they no longer need the 
equipment. Regular dialogue with the soldiers requesting the equipment could better 
inform the program managers of changing requirements. 
Recommendation 3: Allocate Proper Funding for ARAP Program Managers 
My third recommendation is to allocate the right funding for ARAP programs. 
Only a few organizations that specialize in acquiring equipment under rapid initiatives 
have the right types and mix of funding to support the effective development and 
procurement of the equipment. The REF is one of the few organizations with the right 
allocation and type of funding. Program managers with ARAP programs should receive 
the same mix of funding to support procuring and developing programs. For example, 
developing and testing equipment requires research development testing and engineering 
funding. Equipment procurement requires procurement funding and operations and 
maintenance funding to maintain or upgrade structures. Program managers of ARAP 
initiatives lack the proper mix of funding to manage ARAP programs effectively.  
Given the dynamic nature of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Congress should 
consider rapid acquisition funding. Rapid acquisition authority funding exists but comes 
from other programs, and the type of money it transitions to is often unclear and creates 
confusion for the program managers spending the money. Congress should develop a 
new type of funding specifically allocated for rapid acquisition. The last 15 years of war 
have indicated that significant improvements in managing rapid acquisition are possible. 
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Recommendation 4: Institutionalize ARAP Training at DAU  
  My fourth recommendation is to institutionalize ARAP training into Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) training to help expose Army acquisition professionals to 
rapid acquisition initiatives. The DAU classroom exposure would help prepare various 
stakeholders to support rapid acquisition initiatives. Some of the study participants noted 
working with rapid acquisition initiatives is a foreign concept. I further recommend that 
DAU professors integrate rapid acquisition initiative scenarios into capstone exercises to 
complete Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III 
certifications to provide practical experience with rapid acquisition efforts. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Future studies on the ARAP should include a wider population. The study 
participants should not be DAWIA Level III certified but should assist with developing 
rapid acquisition initiatives. Future studies should include more people from the 
requirements community. 
 Future research on rapid initiatives could also involve comparing Air Force rapid 
acquisition initiatives with Army rapid acquisition initiatives. The Air Force and the 
Army have a great deal in common from a ground operations standpoint and often align 
on Joint Service requirements. Future research comparing the two services’ rapid 
initiatives could lead to insight on both services and improve rapid initiatives for both.  
 Future studies should compare the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) with the Army 
Rapid Capability Office. Personnel at REF have supported the war on terrorism since 
2001 and have conducted a tactical mission supporting brigades and below. The true 
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mission of the Army Rapid Capability Office, established in 2016, remains undefined. 
The focus of the Army Rapid Capability Office may be strategically implementing rapid 
acquisition initiatives for key programs. A study in the next 24 months might provide 
insight into how leaders of the two organizations can leverage each other’s capabilities to 
continue delivering equipment to soldiers in a more efficient and timely manner. 
 Although highlighted limitedly in the data collected for this study, the contracting 
process is often an obstruction to delivering equipment to soldiers in a timely manner. 
Future researchers should focus on streamlining the contracting process to support rapid 
acquisition initiatives more effectively. The study participants in future studies of this 
nature should consist mostly of contracting officers with ARAP experience.  
Future ARAP studies should have a larger study participant population. Such a 
study might consist of e-mail surveys and statistical analysis to determine the results. 
Many current acquisition studies are qualitative and have small samples. A future e-mail 
survey study might increase the population pool and include statistical analysis to help 
add to and diversify the body of knowledge on acquisition studies.  
Future studies should consist of interviewing more senior-level officials on rapid 
acquisition initiatives. Such study participants should consist of members of the 
government senior executive service and general officers. Those individuals typically 
have extensive knowledge and ARAP experience and can provide lessons learned based 




Significance to Social Change  
This study contributes to positive social change by improving the national defense 
of the United States through better equipping soldiers to defend against threats to national 
security. The results of this study provided insight and recommendations to improve the 
ARAP. If leaders apply some of the recommendations and lessons learned from the 
participants, then the delivery of quality equipment to soldiers may be more effective and 
efficient.  
This study also contributes to positive social change by ensuring Army 
acquisition professionals continue to be good stewards of U.S. taxpayer dollars. The 
findings and recommendations in this study can contribute to improved efficiencies and 
effectiveness in the ARAP that may improve cost savings, reduce Army acquisition 
timelines through the timely delivery of suitable equipment to soldiers, and improve the 
sustainment of equipment. These improvements may save soldiers’ lives and reduce the 
procurement of nonstandard equipment that increases long-term maintenance costs. 
Significance to Practice  
 U.S. Army leaders have used the ARAP extensively since 2001 and, based on the 
results and findings of this study, some noteworthy lessons can and should apply to 
current and future ARAP initiatives. Practitioners, specifically program managers, should 
implement the sustainment and direct soldier involvement recommendations to improve 
ARAP initiatives. Given the past use of ARAP and the dynamic nature of current world 
events, the use of ARAP or some form of rapid acquisition initiatives will continue in the 
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future by the U.S. Army and other services. The recommendations put forth in this study 
are reasonable, and their logical implementation will improve the ARAP.  
Conclusion 
 The ARAP’s performance at providing equipment to soldiers since 2001 has been 
exceptional, but despite its exceptional performance, there is room for improvement, and 
this study included recommendations from a broad cross-section of Army acquisition 
functional area professionals on ways to improve the ARAP. The key theme that emerged 
from this study was the need for a coherent sustainment plan for equipment procured 
under the ARAP. This was the most prevalent theme highlighted by the majority of study 
participants. This theme also readily appears throughout the literature. Given the support 
to improve the sustainment of the ARAP from both study participants and the literature, 
Army leaders should consider adding adequate sustainment support to all Army rapid 
acquisition initiatives. The two other key themes that deserve consideration and 
implementation are the need to define and decompose requirements and the need for 
program managers to ensure soldiers provide regular feedback during equipment 
development under the ARAP. These two themes will assist in improving the ARAP.  
The Army operates in a dynamic and complex world in which the ARAP will 
continue to serve as the primary means to deliver equipment to soldiers. The Army 
champions itself as a learning and adaptive organization. Applying the lessons learned 
from this study aligns with the Army’s learning and adaptive culture and will continue to 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my doctoral level research study on the 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process. I am Jason Tate and I am doctoral candidate at Walden 
University. I am conducting a doctoral dissertation study to find recommendations on 
how the Army can deliver equipment to soldiers in a more efficient and effective manner. 
The title of the study is an exploratory study on the improvement of the Army Rapid 
Acquisition Process.  
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.  
 
Over the past ten years the Army Rapid Acquisition Process has been used 
extensively. This process delivered equipment to soldiers in numerous locations 
worldwide. This study will assist in documenting the lessons learned from the past 
decade of acquiring equipment through the Army Rapid Acquisition Process.  
 
All data collected during this interview will be recorded. The data will be treated 
as confidential data. Some of the data collected will be published in a doctoral 
dissertation. Names and identifiable information will not be included in the dissertation 
study. The raw data collected will be maintained in a lock box in my house 5 years from 
collection. After 5 years, the data will be destroyed. All other data will be destroyed after 
the publication of the study. A final copy of the published dissertation will be e-mailed to 
each study participant.  
 
Again, thank you for participating this study. Do you have any questions? Are 
you ready to begin? 
 
1a) What is your current job?  
 
1b) How long have you held your current job?  
 
1c) What acquisition jobs have you held in the past?  
  
2a) Do you or did you previously serve in the uniformed military 
 
2b) If yes, in what capacities and for how long? 
  
3a) How many years have you held your current job? 
- Less than 1 year 
- 1-9 years 
- 10 years or more 
 






(IF YES) How many years, in total, did you hold your *previous* acquisition 
jobs? 
- Less than 1 year 
- 1-9 years 
- 10 years or more 
 
3c) How many years have you been working for your current organization? 
- Less than 1 year 
- 1-9 years 
- 10 years or more 
 
3d) Do you, or did you previously, serve in the uniformed military? 
- No, I have never served in the uniformed military (SKIP TO Question 4) 
- Yes, I currently serve in the uniformed military 
- Yes, I previously served in the uniformed military 
 




4a) What is your current Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
level of certification?  
 
4b) In what functional area do you hold this certification (program management, 
contracting, test and evaluation……)? 
 
5) What is your experience with the Army Rapid Acquisition Process? (e.g. RFI, REF, 
CDRT, JRAC, JUONS and JEONS.) 
 
6) In your opinion, what current key issues exist with the Army Rapid Acquisition 
Process, if any?  
 
7) How does the hierarchical structure of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process impact its 
efficiency and effectiveness? 
 
8) How do you assess the Army Rapid Acquisition Process manager’s ability to balance 
achieving the goals of their specific functional area (Test and Evaluation, Requirement 
Managers and others) with a holistic approach of ensuring quality equipment is delivered 




9a) Are Army Rapid Acquisition Process managers focused too much on following the 
rules of the process as opposed to delivering quality equipment to soldiers in a timely 
manner?  
 
9b) If yes, what can be done to refocus the managers? 
 
10a) What are the risks of using the Army Rapid Acquisition Process?   
 
10b) How can the risks be mitigated? 
 
11) Is there a connection between risk mitigation and the existence of bureaucracy in the 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process? If so what is the connection? 
 
12) Are there any key lessons learned that may contribute to the improvement of the 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process? 
 
13) How can the Army best capture and implement the lessons learned from the Army 
Rapid Acquisition Process over the past twelve years?  
 
14) In forecasting the future revisions of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process, what 
critical process components should be considered to deliver more efficient and effective 
quality equipment? 
 
15) If you were able to restructure the Army’s Rapid Acquisition Process, how would 
you restructure it?  
 
16) Do you know of any other individuals who would serve as a good candidate to 





Appendix B: E-mail Solicitation Letter for Potential Study Participants 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: (personalize and add their name) 
 
I am requesting your agreement to participate in a doctoral level research study on 
the Army Rapid Acquisition Process. This study seeks to find recommendations on how 
the Army can deliver equipment to soldiers in a more efficient and effective manner. The 
title of the study is an exploratory study on the improvement of the Army Rapid 
Acquisition Process.  
 
During the past 10 years, the Army Rapid Acquisition Process has been used 
extensively. This process delivered equipment to soldiers in numerous locations 
worldwide. This study will assist in documenting the lessons learned from the past 
decade of acquiring equipment through the Army Rapid Acquisition Process.  
 
As a fellow Army acquisition professional and also a doctoral student, I 
understand that your time is limited and very valuable. I request no more than 60 minutes 
of your time for a personal interview with you on your experiences with the Army Rapid 
Acquisition Process. The results will be used for recommending areas of improvement 
for the Army Rapid Acquisition Process.  
 
All data collected will be treated as confidential data. Some of the data collected 
will be published in a doctoral dissertation. Names and identifiable information will not 
be included in the dissertation study. The raw data collected will be maintained in a lock 
box in my house 5 years from collection. After 5 years, the data will be destroyed. All 
other data will be destroyed after the publication of the study. A final copy of the 
published dissertation will be e-mailed to each study participant.  
 
If you are willing to participate in this study, please reply to this e-mail by 
September 5, 2106 and I will contact you to arrange a date, time and location for me to 
conduct the interview at your convenience. At that time I will ask you to sign a formal 
letter of consent (attached) to participate in the study. Please feel free to call me at XXX-
XXX-XXXX or e-mail me at jason.tate@waldenu.edu if you have any questions. Thank 




Jason F. Tate 
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army 
Doctoral Candidate, PhD Management Program  





Appendix C: Study Participant Letter of Consent 
 
Dear Army Acquisition Professional,  
 
This letter is to obtain your formal consent to participate in a research project that 
assesses the effectiveness of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process. Specifically, the intent 
of this study aims to determine ways to improve the Army Rapid Acquisition Process to 
deliver equipment to solders in a more efficient and effective manner.  
 
This study will include 15 to 20 study participants who will be interviewed on the 
effectiveness of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process. Each interview will last no more 
than 60 minutes and will take in a place face-to-face venue for each study participant. 
After the interview is complete, the study participant will receive a copy of the interview 
transcript via email for a chance to confirm or correct the accuracy of data collected. 
  
I, as the researcher will have access to the interview data transcripts. If you 
choose to withdraw from the study, your data will be destroyed immediately. Your 
participation in this study is completely voluntary. Although there are no foreseeable 
risks for this study, you may withdraw from this study at any time for any reason. There 
is no penalty for withdrawing or deciding not to participate in this study.  
 
Research data will be collected between July 2017 to November 2016. 
Participation and record of participation in this study will be confidential. Data will be 
kept in a secure location in an effort to ensure data cannot be traced back to the study 
participants. Additionally, names and identifiable personal information will not be 
included in the dissertation. 
 
I am an Army acquisition professional and also a doctoral student at Walden 
University working under the direction of Dr. Walter McCollum and Dr. Donna Brown  
at the College of Management and Technology, Walden University. If you have any 
questions regarding this research project, please call me at XXX-XXX-XXXX or email 
me at jason.tate@waldenu.edu. This project has been reviewed in accordance with the 
Walden University policies and the Army Research Institute procedures that govern your 
participation in this research. Questions or concerns regarding this study can be directed 
to the Walden University Research Participant Advocate at 612-312-1210. 
 
The Walden University IRB approval number for this study is 06-09-16-0129608 
and the expiration date for this IRB approval is June 8, 2017. 
 
A check in the box and your signature provide your consent to participate in this 
study. Please have this signed letter available to submit to me at the start of our scheduled 














Jason F. Tate 
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army 
Doctoral Candidate, PhD Management Program  






Appendix D: Interview Question Review Protocol 
 
Acquisition Professional Role and Responsibility for Reviewing Interview Questions 
Thank you for agreeing to review the interview questions for the research study 
on the Army Rapid Acquisition Process (ARAP). Your input is important because as a 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) professor, you are considered to be an expert on 
defense acquisition processes. Given your experience with teaching and working within 
the community of Army acquisition professionals, you have the requisite skill set to 
analyze the enclosed interview questions. I ask that you ensure the interview questions 
are adequate in determining the issues associated with ARAP. I also ask that you 
determine if the interview questions are sufficient enough to provide recommendations to 
improve the ARAP. Additionally, I ask that you specifically provide an assessment of the 
questions and provide recommendations for additional questions and make suggested 
edits to the standing interview questions listed below. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this exploratory case study is to increase knowledge and 
understanding of the deficiencies of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section 
of Army acquisition functional area professionals. Though there has been some research 
on ARAP, the research conducted to date fails to exploit the expertise and competencies 
of the various acquisition functional areas. Instead, previous research was performed by a 
narrow range of acquisition expertise (mostly from a program management perspective), 
and relied primarily on personal opinion rather than scholarly analysis of original 
documents and experiences. Thus, there is a need to expand ARAP research and consider 
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the views of acquisition professionals from a wider range of functional specialties and 
expertise. Those various acquisition functional areas considered for my study are 
program management, contracting, test and evaluation, science and technology, and 
systems engineering.  
Main Research Questions for the Study 
RQ1: What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of equipment using the 
current ARAP?  
RQ2: What key factors are present that impact the performance, effectiveness and 
efficiency of ARAP and that could serve as a basis for developing improvements in 
equipment acquisition? 
RQ3: How do the theories of bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy align with and 
explain the ARAP? 
Nature of Study  
This will be an exploratory qualitative case study that involves interviewing Army 
acquisition professionals who have experience working with the ARAP. The aim of the 
interviews is to increase knowledge and understanding on the deficiencies of the ARAP 
and then to elicit recommendations on how to improve the ARAP. The methodology will 
include purposive and snowball sample techniques for 15-20 Army acquisition 
professionals who have worked in the Army acquisition community for a minimum of 6 
years and are Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III 
certified in a functional area. First, I will create interview questions and conduct a field 
test with subject matter experts from the Army acquisition field. After the field study is 
successfully conducted, I will sample the population through semistructured interviews. 
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Finally, I will transcribe, code, and analyze the data with the qualitative analysis NVivo 
11 software.  
 If you have any questions about the study or the interview questions, please 









Jason F. Tate 
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army 
Doctoral Candidate, PhD Management Program  







Appendix E: Solicitation Letter for Field Study Participants 
Dear Sir or Madam: (personalize and add their name) 
 
I am requesting your participation in a field study to support in a doctoral level research 
study on the Army Rapid Acquisition Process. The title of the study is an exploratory study on 
the improvement of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process. The field study consists of 16 research 
questions on the rapid acquisition process. 
 
The purpose of this study is to increase knowledge and understanding of the deficiencies 
of the ARAP through the lens of a broad cross-section of Army acquisition functional area 
professionals. The study seeks to find recommendations on how the Army can deliver equipment 
to soldiers in a more efficient and effective manner.  
 
The 3 main research questions for this study are listed below. 
1) What key problems have surfaced in the acquisition of equipment using the current 
ARAP?  
2) What key factors are present that impact the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of 
ARAP and that could serve as a basis for developing improvements in equipment 
acquisition? 
3) How do the theories of bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy align with and explain the 
ARAP? 
 
This will be an exploratory qualitative case study that involves interviewing Army 
acquisition professionals who have experience working with the ARAP. The methodology will 
include purposive and snowball sample techniques for 15-20 Army acquisition professionals who 
have worked in the Army acquisition community for a minimum of 6 years and are Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III certified in a functional area. The 
data from the interview questions will be transcribed, coded, and analyzed undergo qualitative 
analysis with NVivo 11 software. As an expert in rapid acquisition, I ask that you review and 
provide comments on 16 interview questions. I need you to determine if the questions are 
sufficient to increase the knowledge and understanding of the ARAP from a broad section of 
acquisition professionals. I encourage you to make recommendations to the questions and provide 
feedback to me on the questions via e-mail. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this study to support my doctoral study, please reply to 
this e-mail by DATE. At that time I will provide you a copy of the 16 interview questions. Please 
feel free to call me at XXX-XXX-XXXX or e-mail me at jason.tate@waldenu.edu if you have 
any questions. Thank you for your time.  
 
 
Jason F. Tate 
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army 
Doctoral Candidate, PhD Management Program  






Interview Questions for Review on the Army Rapid Acquisition Process 
 
1) What is your current job, how long have you held your current job, and what 
acquisition jobs have you held in the past?  
  
2) Do you or did you previously serve in the uniformed military, if so, in what capacities 
and for how long? 
  
3a) How many years have you held your current job? 
- Less than 1 year 
- 1-9 years 
- 10 years or more 
 




(IF YES) How many years, in total, did you hold your previous acquisition 
jobs? 
- Less than 1 year 
- 1-9 years 
- 10 years or more 
 
3c) How many years have you been working for your current organization? 
- Less than 1 year 
- 1-9 years 
- 10 years or more 
 
3d) Do you, or did you previously, serve in the uniformed military? 
- No, I have never served in the uniformed military (SKIP TO Question 4) 
- Yes, I currently serve in the uniformed military 
- Yes, I previously served in the uniformed military 
 




4) What is your current Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
level of certification and in what functional area do you hold this certification (program 
management, contracting, test and evaluation……)? 
 
5) What is your experience with the Army Rapid Acquisition Process? (e.g. RFI, REF, 




6) In your opinion, what current key issues exist with the Army Rapid Acquisition 
Process, if any?  
 
7) How does the hierarchical structure of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process impact its 
efficiency and effectiveness? 
 
8) How do you assess the Army Rapid Acquisition Process manager’s ability to balance 
achieving the goals of their specific functional area (Test and Evaluation, Requirement 
Managers and others) with a holistic approach of ensuring quality equipment is delivered 
to soldiers in a timely manner? 
 
9) Are Army Rapid Acquisition Process managers focused too much on following the 
rules of the process as opposed to delivering quality equipment to soldiers in a timely 
manner? If so, what can be done to refocus the managers? 
 
10) What are the risks of using the Army Rapid Acquisition Process, and how can the 
risks be mitigated? 
 
11) Is there a connection between risk mitigation and the existence of bureaucracy in the 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process? If so what is the connection? 
 
12) Are there any key lessons learned that may contribute to the improvement of the 
Army Rapid Acquisition Process? 
 
13) How can the Army best capture and implement the lessons learned from the Army 
Rapid Acquisition Process over the past twelve years?  
 
14) In forecasting the future revisions of the Army Rapid Acquisition Process, what 
critical process components should be considered to deliver more efficient and effective 
quality equipment? 
 
15) If you were able to restructure the Army’s Rapid Acquisition Process, how would 
you restructure it?  
 
16) Do you know of any other individuals who would serve as a good candidate to 
participate in this study? 
 
